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1  Introduction 
In this thesis I study how nationalism and nationhood are constructed in Hungary during 
national day gatherings organized by radical right-wing party Jobbik “The Movement for 
Better Hungary”.  I chose to focus on Jobbik, which has been in parliament since 2010, 
as understanding the character of this new political force is central to shedding light on 
recent developments in Hungary. I approach the national day gatherings from a holistic 
and multisensory perspective with a special emphasis on visual symbols and ritual 
expressions of nationhood (see Picture 1).  
 
Picture 1 Jobbik’s gatherings were filled with flag symbolism containing various nationalist and party specific 
elements.   
I consider national day gatherings as rituals that involve the audience in the act of 
commemoration on different levels and senses. Symbols present in these events, such as 
flags, maps, coat of arms and anthems are used to express the connection between the 
participants and a certain nation or group. Rituals, on the other hand, make possible the 
realisation of these symbolic attachments with visual and audible means (Fox & Miller-
Idriss, 2008, p. 545). In Jobbik’s gatherings it is not only the party elite that is responsible 
for the production side of the events, but also the audience is actively creating these 
contents. This can be seen as an echo from Jobbik’s past as a social movement or simply 
as one of the characteristic of populist and anti-elite parties. Politicians who permit more 
active role for the participants and as argued by Giesen (2006, p. 355), act as authentic 
representatives of the people, blur the limits between party elites and supporters, or 
“leaders and followers”.  
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The empirical material of this study consists of photos, videos and field notes that I have 
made during my three field trips to Hungary as well as transcriptions of speeches held by 
the party leadership. I attended the following national day gatherings organized by 
Jobbik: 20 August 2013 (Saint Stephen's Day, Foundation of the Hungarian State), 23 
October 2013 (1956 Revolution Memorial Day), and 15 March 2014 (Memorial Day of 
the 1848 Revolution). These were the last three national day commemorations organized 
before the April 2014 parliamentary elections.  
1.1 Multisensory approach to nationalism 
In this study I focus on visual symbols and ritual acts, such as singing and marching, 
which I consider more open to the audience’s participation and initiatives. I contrast this 
dimension with the speeches held by the party leadership, which are considered to be an 
activity reserved mainly for party leaders. A closer look to these speech rituals reveals 
that even here the role of the audience, no matter how limited, is crucial for their success. 
In other words, I wish to approach the events as being constructed both from above by 
the elites and from below by the participants (see Fox, 2014).  
It is important to notice that verbal and non-verbal expressions of nationhood can also 
convey different messages and might vary in their tone. What cannot be said might still 
be shown. In my analysis of the national day gatherings I divide my interest between 
following two aspects: talking and performing the nation or in this case, the “Jobbikian 
nationhood”1. The participants in these events actively perform the nation through various 
visual symbols and acts, whereas the party leadership’s speeches give an example of how 
the new interpretations of the nation are talked into existence in the present with the help 
of powerful historical and mythical accounts that are part of the group’s collective 
memory.  
My data collection methods reflect the diversity of the ways in which the Jobbikian 
nationalism and nationhood are constructed during national days. Just like we should not 
close our eyes from the non-verbal expressions of nationhood, we should not try to limit 
our empirical analysis to words only. My own approach has been tailored for this specific 
                                                 
1 My use of the term “Jobbikian” aims at giving a name for the distinct type of nationalism and 
nationhood which Jobbik represents. I use the term “nationhood”, since it refers both to nation and 
identity, meaning “the state or fact of being a nation; national independence or autonomy; national, 
ethnic, or cultural identity” (Oxford English Dictionary). 
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topic and combines different methods, such as visual ethnography, participant 
observation and thematic reading of the speeches.  
Although the historical context of the symbols present in Jobbik’s national day gatherings 
is introduced rather extensively, this study is not primarily an examination of history of 
national symbols or heraldry. Instead, it approaches national symbols and rituals in their 
social context and through the ways they are used. This multisensory universe is full of 
non-verbal communication that does not open to outsiders very easily. To understand the 
meanings embedded in the specific symbols required sometimes an extensive studying of 
the different historical traditions, especially the ones connected to the inter-war years. 
However, some aspects are bound to remain hidden, which I do not consider a problem 
since the primary aim of this study is not to discover all the private meanings people 
connect to these symbols. Instead, I have observed the publicly enacted and performed 
meanings as well as how the common use of symbols creates solidarity (Durkheim, 1964 
[1912]) and constructs a distinctive understanding of Hungarianness that I call “Jobbikian 
nationhood”.  
Studying the radical right-wing party Jobbik is important also for understanding the 
current developments in the Hungarian society. Traditionally, Jobbik has relied on an 
anti-Roma discourse (see Stewart, 2012). The shift from using the Roma population as a 
scape goat for many societal problems and for raising xenophobia and fear during 
Jobbik’s 2010 election campaign has paved the way for currently introducing the “illegal 
immigrants” as a new threat for the Hungarian nation. Immigration has been raised as the 
most important question in Hungarian politics by Jobbik and the ruling party Fidesz, 
which has become known in recent years of its tendency to hijack issues previously 
brought up by the biggest opposition party Jobbik. Some have argued that this is only 
Fidesz’ way to take the wind from Jobbik’s sails, but Krekó and Mayer (2015, p. 201) 
claim that Jobbik serves Fidesz as a “pioneer” by marking new ideological pathways.  
The national referendum organized on 2 October 2016 tells something about the direction 
to which Hungary has been led as a result of this peculiar dynamics between Jobbik and 
Fidesz. The leading question voters had to answer was: “Do you want the European Union 
to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary 
even without the approval of the parliament?” (Hungarian Government, 2016). A vast 
majority of voters answered unsurprisingly “no”, but the voting activity did not reach the 
required 50% for the referendum to be valid. Studying Hungarian right-wing nationalism, 
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with a strong ethnic component, provides needed insights for understanding the reasons 
why the idea of a pluralistic society with a wide value base has not been a success in 
Hungary. 
1.2 Research questions 
Based on my theoretical framework that I introduce in Chapter 3, I propose that 
nationalism is not an all-encompassing and uniform ideology, but rather manifests in 
several competing versions. I also suggest that nationalism is not “ready” but evolves 
through repetition, rituals and articulation (see e.g. Hosking & Schöpflin, 1997). National 
days are one of those moments that enable this collective ritualistic construction of the 
nation. During them collective memory is produced, reproduced and rearticulated in the 
present through ritualistic enactment (Connerton, 1989; Giesen, 2006). 
Durkheim famously claims in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1964 [1912]) 
that rituals create solidarity. After him the neo-Durkheimian school has expanded this 
idea to modern societies and considers national day celebrations as events that enhance 
national solidarity. In this thesis I claim that national commemorations create solidarity, 
but only among the participants. Since in Hungary people celebrate in fragmented 
communities (see for example Nyyssönen, 2008 and Palonen, 2006) and many do not 
attend these events at all, the national solidarity is constructed within the distinct groups 
who commemorate together (Kertzer, 1988). These communities, which are built around 
political parties, contest over the notion of “real Hungarian nation”. Jobbik speaks in the 
name of 15 million Hungarians (Hungarians living both within and outside the state 
borders), but still they exclude many significant groups from the national community 
(such as the Roma, Jews and even supporters of the left-wing parties). In this research I 
clarify this phenomenon more specifically.   
The party leader’s speech is an important part of the national day ritual. A successful 
speech can create, interpret, identify and strengthen common points of reference. Rituals, 
on the other hand, are capable of creating an emotional sense of belonging without 
bringing up possible differences in opinions. Ambiguous symbols such as flags can unite 
masses from different backgrounds.   
The previous studies of Jobbik have focused on themes such as reasons behind the rise of 
Jobbik’s popularity, composition of the party’s electorate and Jobbik’s online subculture. 
These studies picture Jobbik as a radical right-wing, nationalist and populist party with a 
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young, charismatic leader. Its success is seen as a result of successful politicization of the 
Roma question2, economic crisis and general disillusionment towards the main political 
forces (Stewart, 2012; Karácsony & Róna, 2010; Grajczjár & Tóth, 2011). For populist 
parties bringing emotions to politics is common (see e.g. Mouffe, 2005), but there has 
been only little discussion on this. Also ethnographic approach seems underrepresented. 
My study aims for one’s part at improving this situation and providing more in-depth 
knowledge of Jobbik and its distinct worldview. 3  
My first research question is: How nationalism is constructed, articulated and performed 
during Jobbik’s national day gatherings by using visual, ritual and verbal means? Are 
the visual and verbal elements telling the same story?  
My second research question is: To what extent Jobbik’s nationalism, which is 
constructed during the national gatherings, acts in a uniting or in a dividing way? How 
is solidarity formed among the participants? 
I approach my research questions by first introducing both the historical and the current 
political context of Hungary and elements that are significant for Hungarian national self-
image (Chapter 2). These are essential for understanding the “Jobbikian nationhood”. In 
the following Chapter 3, I present the theoretical bases of my thesis. The main themes I 
introduce are nationalism and nationhood, collective commemorations and the study of 
rituals and symbols. In Chapter 4, I present my method, which is based on ethnographic 
approach with specific emphasis on visual research. My analysis is based on my empirical 
material: photos, film stills and field notes, as well as transcribed speeches, is presented 
in Chapter 5. Finally, in conclusions (Chapter 6) I reflect my empirical findings in relation 
to the wider theoretical frame and the current developments in Hungary.       
                                                 
2 The ‘Roma question’ refers the situation of Hungary’s largest ethnic minority that is largely living in 
deep poverty. Jobbik claims that ‘gypsy criminality’ if one of the biggest societal problems in Hungary 
(Jobbik, 2010b). 
3 After completing my fieldwork, a new book on the topic was published: Nemzet a mindennapokban – Az 
újnacionalizmus populáris kultúrája [Nation in everyday life: The neo-nationalism’s popular culture] 
(2014). It approaches the topic of everyday nationalism in Hungary from qualitative and ethnographic 
perspective. 
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2 Research context 
In this chapter I first introduce the main developments in the Hungarian political life 
during the past couple of decades. My main emphasis is on the last three parliamentary 
elections held in 2006, 2010 and 2014. Secondly, I explain what kind of importance the 
treaty of Trianon, signed in 1920 after the World War I, has had for the Hungarian self-
image. Thirdly, I introduce the three Hungarian national days, whose commemorations I 
have observed. Fourthly, I explain what is meant with (new) radical right-wing parties 
and populism and lastly present a thorough introduction of Jobbik and the previous 
research concerning the party. 
2.1 Hungarian political development 
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted 
in the new flourishing of nationalism in East Central Europe, where national 
characteristics had been downplayed for decades and replaced by common socialist 
ideology. In Hungary the national re-awakening meant rehabilitating the old national 
traditions and celebrations as well as abandoning the socialist ones.  
In the beginning of the new millennium Hungary was considered to be a model example 
of a state, which had completed a successful transition from socialism to parliamentary 
democracy and from planned economy to market economy. This development was 
followed by Hungary’s accession to the NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. In 2006 
elections, the governing socialist party MSZP and the Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány 
were able to renew their mandate and continue for a second term. However, it soon 
became clear that Hungary was in need of big reforms and that the severity of the 
economic situation had been downplayed by the government during the election 
campaign. (See e.g. Korkut, 2012.) The situation escalated during the autumn 2006 when 
prime minister Gyurcsány’s private speech, in which he admitted that the government had 
been lying about the country’s economic situation, was leaked to the public (ibid., p.70). 
The political scandal that followed led to loss of Gyurcsány’s and MSZP’s 
trustworthiness in the eyes of the voters, street protests and a general distrust, which was 
further emphasized by the 2008 economic crisis (Korkut, 2012). However, Gyurcsány 
maintained his position as a prime minister until 2009 when he was finally replaced after 
a vote of confidence (ibid., p. 143). Consequently, and in lack of alternatives on the left, 
parliamentary elections held in Hungary in April 2010 led to a landslide victory of the 
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conservative right-wing party Fidesz, which gained 263 from the 386 seats of the 
parliament (almost 70%) forming a single party government. (Derexindex, 2016.) This 
unseeingly vast support provided Fidesz the possibility to pass laws and change the 
constitution without needing to pay attention to other parties’ opinions, and later to redraw 
the electoral map for future elections, tilting the system to its favour.  
In the 2010 elections, the decline of the left was further emphasized by the rise of the 
radical nationalist right-wing party Jobbik “The Movement for Better Hungary” (Jobbik 
Magyarországért Mozgalom)4. Although, in 2009 Jobbik had been able to gain three seats 
in the European Parliament, their immense success in 2010 parliamentary elections was 
a big surprise for many. Jobbik gained 47 seats in the parliament with 17% support. This 
was only two percentages less than the earlier governing socialist party, MSZP, which 
gained 19% of the votes after a dramatic fall in popularity. (Derexindex, 2016.)  
In the April 2014 elections Fidesz was able to maintain 2/3 of the parliamentary seats 
even if it lost a significant amount of the votes5. This was due to the changes Fidesz made 
in the electoral system. With only 45% of the votes they were able to secure 133 seats out 
of 199. Jobbik, on the other hand, was able to increase their support from 17% to 20%, 
but due to the new election law they only won 23 seats (12%). The left wing alliance of 
several parties, coined as “Unity” (Összefogás)6 gained 26% of the votes resulting 38 
seats. (Derexindex, 2016.) In addition to changing the electoral legislation Fidesz enjoyed 
unfair advantage due to “restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and 
campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State” 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2014, p. 1). 
The eastward expansion of the EU in 2004 and 2007 was expected to weaken nationalism 
in the new member states, but the development in Hungary has been quite the opposite 
(Fox & Vermeersch, 2010, p. 325-326). For the ruling right wing party Fidesz EU has 
offered an agenda for its national interests. Fidesz defines itself as a representative of the 
Hungarian nation defending all the ethnic Hungarians irrespective where they live. 
Hungary’s joining the EU did not mean for Fidesz abandoning its nationalist ambitions, 
but on the contrary, offered it a new agenda. (Fox & Vermeersch, 2010.) Nationalism is 
central for both Fidesz and Jobbik and growing the national pride of the Hungarian people 
                                                 
4 The word “Jobbik” is actually a pun meaning both “better” and “right”. 
5 Jobbik won a by-election on April 12th 2015 after the death of a Fidesz MP resulting Fidesz losing its 2/3 
majority. 
6 “Unity” (Összefogás) was an electoral pact formed by the MSZP, Együtt, DK, Liberálisok and PM.  
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has been regularly on their agenda. On the other hand, EU has been seen as an institution 
that interferes on sovereign state businesses and is not able to understand the situation in 
Hungary. Publicly Fidesz condemns most of the proposals of Jobbik, but has later on 
actually applied some of them.  
2.2 Hungarian’s national self-image and the Treaty of Trianon 
Territory and place can be seen as two key components of both group and individual 
identity. People have often deep emotional bonds with a certain territory and 
understanding this attachment is crucial for the study of nations and nationalism. (White, 
2000, p. 4-6.) According to Kürti (2001, pp. 2-3) this connection to territory and its 
centrality to national consciousness is especially important to countries in East and 
Central Europe. Myths and memories are important for creating this strong emotional 
attachment to a nation and they also form the base for territorial claims. (Smith, 1999, p. 
9.) One such myth is the so called “myth of ethnic election”, according to which God has 
chosen exactly that particular nation to guard and govern the region (Smith, 2002, p. 19). 
In the Hungarian historiography the idea of chosenness is visible from the times the 
Hungarians settled in the Carpathian Basin around the year 896 until the times of Austro-
Hungarian Empire. According to Brubaker and colleagues (2008, p. 74) Hungarians have 
felt “long-standing and pronounced sense of political, cultural and civilizational 
superiority” especially towards Romanians.  
Transylvania (Erdély) is a territory currently located in western Romania. It is, and has 
been since the wake of Hungarian and Romanian nationalism, a core territory for both of 
the countries’ national identity. Transylvania can be seen as one of the contested 
territories in Europe along with areas like Kosovo, Northern Ireland and Cyprus (Kürti, 
2001, p. ix). It is historically, and still today, one of the most diverse regions in Europe in 
terms of language, religion and ethnicity (Brubaker et al., 2008 p. 65). Many events and 
places that are significant for the modern nations of Hungary and Romania originate from 
times before the idea of a nation state was developed. In spite of this, the nationalistic 
history writing often refers to distant historical events and places as if they would present 
the nationalistic endeavours of present-day states. (See White, 2000, p. 98.)  
Hungarian national self-image is profoundly influenced by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon 
and loss of Transylvania. To many Hungarians the treaty signified the end of the 
Hungarian empire, or in the national narrative, the end of unity of the chosen people 
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(Pytlas, 2016, p. 156). After the World War I winners of the war gathered in the Grand 
Trianon palace of Versailles in France to decide the faith of Hungary that had lost the 
war. The terms of the treaty were very strict, because Hungary was seen as the successor 
of Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and its population 
dropped from 18 to 8 million. Around 3 million ethnic Hungarians remained outside the 
Hungarian borders in the neighbouring countries, mainly in Romania and 
Czechoslovakia. The Treaty of Trianon caused overwhelming embitterment in 
Hungarians and revision became the main aim of the politics in the coming decades. 
(Vehviläinen, 2004, p. 204.) During the inter-war years Hungary was led by national 
conservative Regent Miklós Horthy. It is noteworthy that besides revisionism the Horthy 
era was affected by racist right-wing radicalism, anti-modernism, anti-liberalism and anti-
Semitism (Kovács, 2016, p. 526). Even if none of the current parties make openly 
revisionist claims, the Treaty of Trianon is far from forgotten in Hungary. It remains 
central for the Hungarian national identity, especially among the conservative and right-
wing parties and their supporters. 
Since the first free elections in 1990 the situation of ethnic Hungarians in the 
neighbouring countries has been a central theme on the political agenda. It has also had 
major impact on the relations between Hungary and its neighbouring states. The status of 
ethnic Hungarians has been especially important to Fidesz and its leader Viktor Orbán. 
The first law amendment of Fidesz in 2010, was to provide Hungarian citizenship to all 
ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries, sparking considerable debate. In 
addition, Fidesz passed a law stating that 4 June, the day when Treaty of Trianon was 
signed, is to be commemorated as the Day of National Unity (Nemzeti összetartozás 
napja) (see e.g. Feischmidt, 2014; Pytlas, 2016). All these changes have been long 
initiated by radical right Jobbik, but Fidesz implemented these suggestions according to 
its own agenda. For example, Jobbik considers the name of Trianon memorial day “The 
Day of National Unity” an outrage, because it emphasizes unity instead of trauma and 
revision. According to Jobbik the day should be therefore commemorated as “The 
National Day of Mourning” (Nemzeti gyász napja) (Jobbik, 2014c). Feischmidt (2014, p. 
55) has brought up an alternative perspective according to which, even if Trianon is still 
a strong emotional symbol, it is used primarily to express the current societal problems, 
not the historical trauma. Feischmidt argues that reasons for the re-emergence of these 
symbols have to be searched from the present context, and considers Trianon a sign of 
resistance (ibid.). 
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2.3 Hungarian National Days 
National days worldwide have varying historical roots. Some of the national days have 
religious background, whereas some have very old pagan origin. The more recent national 
days are often connected to nation building. These are for example: liberation days, state 
and constitution-founding days, conquest days and days of mourning. (McCrone and 
McPherson, 2009, p. 2.) 
Hungarian national days together with the trauma of Trianon carry in themselves many 
core ingredients of the Hungarian national self-understanding. According to Pytlas (2016, 
p. 156), these historical legacies have a central place in the process of national self-
definition. Firstly, there is the Hungary’s first king St. Stephen and his Holy Crown that 
are celebrated on 20 August.7 They symbolize the thousand-year-old Hungarian empire 
and the seemingly eternal community of Hungarians. The other two defining moments, 
the failed revolutions of 15 March 1848 and 23 October 1956 emphasise the historical 
self-image of Hungarians as tragic heroes and stress the cult of victimization and 
martyrdom.  
August 20, Saint Stephen’s Day, Foundation of the Hungarian State 
Saint Stephen’s Day on 20 August commemorates the foundation of the Hungarian state 
in year 1000 and its first king Saint Stephen (Szent István) (Bertényi, 2000, p. 12). In 
order to legitimate his power St. Stephen asked crown from Pope Sylvester II and he was 
crowned as the first Christian king of Hungary in the beginning of the new millennium 
(either on Christmas in 1000 or New Year 1001).  This day is seen as the founding day of 
the Hungarian state. (Takalo, 2004, p. 38.)  
St. Stephen was canonized on 20 August, 1083, 45 years after his death in 1038. His tomb 
was opened the same year and Stephen’s right hand was found intact in it. Ever since 
“The Holy Dexter” has been a sacred relic for the Catholic Church and it is still carried 
in a glass box around the St. Stephen’s Basilica on 20 August. (Bertényi, 2000, pp. 12-
13.) Seven years after the canonisation of St. Stephen, 20 August was declared a saint 
feast. Many centuries later, in 1771, the day received a status of a compulsory feast by 
the Habsburg queen Maria Theresa. This originally religious commemoration’s nature 
                                                 
7 In reality the crown is from a later era (see Nyyssönen, 2001). However, the historical facts seem to 
carry only little weight, when mythical past is being made. 
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changed over time and in 1938 on the 900th anniversary of St. Stephen’s death it became 
a national holiday. (Nyyssönen, 2008, p. 176.) 
In 1945 Hungary was occupied by the Red Army. This marked the beginning of the 
socialist era that was characterised by the growing strength of the Hungarian Communist 
party (MKP). Religious commemorations were not something the new regime wished to 
promote. As a solution 20 August was chosen in 1949 to be the day when the new socialist 
constitution came into force. From then on it was celebrated officially as the Constitution 
Day of the Hungarian People’s Republic. Furthermore, different folk traditions were 
promoted and 20 August became known also as the feast of the new bread. (Nyyssönen, 
2008, p. 176.) After the socialist era came to an end in 1989 the day got back its original 
meaning as the day of St. Stephen. In 1991 the Hungarian Parliament chose 20 August to 
be the official state holiday instead of the other two candidates 15 March and October 23 
that remained as national holidays (ibid., 2008, p. 172). Due to 20 August celebration’s 
historical roots that reach over millennia, it raises less political passions than the two other 
national holidays, which I introduce in the following two sections.  
March 15, Memorial Day of the 1848 Revolution 
The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and the War of Independence of 1848-1849 were part 
of a wider phenomenon in Europe called the Spring of Nations or the Year of Revolution. 
Especially the events in Paris during February acted as a catalyst to the events in Hungary 
in March. In 1848 Hungary was part of the multinational Habsburg Monarchy and one of 
the main aims of the revolutionaries was to have an own national government. In addition, 
many reforms were demanded in so called “12 points” that were written by a group of 
young radical thinkers formed around a young poet, Sándor Petőfi. These included, 
among others, claims for independent Hungarian government, own institutions and 
freedom of the press. (Huotari, 2004, pp. 146-147.) 
At first the demands for an own government were accepted by the emperor Ferdinand V 
and Hungary’s first government was founded with Count Lajos Batthyány as the Prime 
Minister. However, soon the new government had to realize that these concessions were 
only temporary. Croatians, Serbs and Slovakians living in the region were giving dubious 
promises by the emperor that aimed at causing conflict between different groups and 
weakening the Hungarian revolutionary government. Soon the situation escalated in such 
ways that Hungary ended up in an open war with the national minorities. Finally, the 
Habsburg army was sent against the Hungarian army. Hungarians fought against the 
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Emperor’s troops with varying success sometimes losing and sometimes gaining back the 
territories. In the end, what sealed the fate of the revolution and Hungarian army, was the 
support of the Tsar Nicholas I for the Emperor’s troops. After being forced to fight against 
200 000 Russian soldiers in the east as well as the Habsburg army in the west, Hungary 
had to surrender 13 August 1849. (Huotari, 2004, pp. 148-155.) 
Although the War of Independence ended as a failure, it is a central part of the Hungarian 
national story and it is remembered nowadays as a symbol of bravery and national spirit 
(Huotari, 2004, p. 155). The Memorial Day of the 1848 Revolution is celebrated on 15 
March, which is the day when Hungarian national poet Sándor Petőfi read his poem 
“National Song” on the stairs of the National Museum to the crowds that had gathered 
there inspired by the revolutionary spirit (ibid., p. 147). Due to the day’s rather charged 
nature 15 March has not always been the day chosen for the official commemoration. 
The significance of the 1848 Revolution has been and still is so important for the 
Hungarian national self-understanding that none of the rulers and regimes that have 
followed could ignore it. As the years passed many rulers, such as Regent Miklós Horthy 
during the inter-war years and the Communist party after the World War II, have 
attempted to confiscate the commemoration to promote their own agenda. The 
authoritarian and conservative Horthy regime was well aware of the hidden potential of 
15 March, but had difficulties in exploiting it since freedom and revolution were not 
values it wished to promote. The solution was to emphasize the militarization of the 
Hungarian nation instead. This strategy was, nevertheless, not able to suppress the more 
favoured interpretations, which were promoted by the opposition and associated with 
equal rights and freedom. (Gerő, 1997, pp. 241-245.) 
After the World War II the Hungarian Communist party (MKP) gained more and more 
power. Though the ideology of the new regime differed greatly from its predecessors’, 
the need to exploit the events of 1848 was ever-present. Many of the heroes of 1848, such 
as Petőfi, were now presented as some sort of “proto-communists” and soon the portraits 
of the 1848 freedom fighters were presented side by side with those of Lenin, Stalin and 
the leader of the MKP Mátyás Rákosi. These attempts were proven futile in 1956, when 
the ever stronger demands for democratisation and freedom led to a new revolution, in 
which the example of 1848 was of great importance and inspiration. (Gerő, 1997, pp. 245-
246.)   
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October 23, Memorial Day of the 1956 Revolution  
The series of events that are nowadays known as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 were 
pre-dated by increased student activism and gatherings of intellectual discussion groups 
such as the “Petőfi Circle” (Petőfi Kör) 8. Also a new independent student association was 
founded and soon it demanded reforms from the ruling communist party. The actual 
uprising started as a student demonstration in Budapest on 23 October. Many intellectuals, 
workers and other citizens joined the demonstrators and it is estimated that up to 200 000 
people took part in it. (Litván, 1996, pp. 54-57.) The crowd gathered in front of the 
Hungarian Parliament calling for Imre Nagy, a former Prime Minister who was earlier 
put aside due to his liberal views. Nagy arrived to speak to the people from a balcony 
above the square, but his moderate statements and advice about going home was a 
disappointment to the demonstrators. Later in the evening some of the demonstrators 
crushed a huge statue of Stalin while others headed to the Hungarian Radio building 
attempting to occupy it. The earlier rather peaceful uprising turned into an armed uprising 
as gunfire erupted between the demonstrators and the soldiers defending the building. 
(ibid., pp. 57-58.)    
In the following days the situation quickly escalated. On 24 October Nagy was re-elected 
as the Prime Minister. Only a day later a peaceful demonstration in front of the parliament, 
demanding for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops turned to a bloody 
massacre, when the units of the security forces opened fire. More than a hundred people 
were left dead and wounded. Four days later Prime Minister Nagy announced that the 
Soviet troops, which were earlier called to Budapest to get the situation under control, 
would leave from the capital. Only couple days later, 1 November, Nagy declared 
withdrawal from the Warsaw pact and announced Hungary as a neutral state. (Litván, 
1996, pp. 69-79.) 
In the meanwhile, the displaced leaders of the Hungarian Communist party were 
negotiating with Moscow and gathering forces for an armed intervention. It was also 
secretly agreed that Imre Nagy would be replaced by János Kádár. What had first seemed 
as a victory for Nagy’s liberal government turned out to be just a needed break for the 
Hungarian Communist leadership to prepare for action with Moscow. On 4 November 
the Soviet tanks rolled back into Budapest and quickly ended the armed resistance and 
                                                 
8 Petőfi Circle was named after the famous poet Sándor Petőfi who played a significant role in the 1848 
revolution. 
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street fights. (Litván, 1996, pp. 79-82.) In the aftermath of the revolution Nagy and his 
closest allies were imprisoned and finally executed on 16 June 1958. All in all, around 
3000 people died during the uprising, 360 people were sentenced to death and thousands 
more imprisoned and around 180 000 people escaped from the country. (Huotari, 2004, 
p. 282.)  
During the 33 years of socialist rule that followed the 1956 Revolution, no open 
commemorations were allowed. This did not stop people sharing memories of the event 
and legends related to it. Therefore, when the socialist era did come to an end in 1989, 
the day that was chosen for declaring the Hungarian Republic, was 23 October. 
(Nyyssönen, 2008, p. 178.)  In this way the events of 23 October in 1956 achieved new 
meanings and the leaders of Hungarian Republic could legitimize their power and draw 
strength from the legacy of the revolution.      
2.4 Radical right and populism 
According to Rydgren (2007), the new radical right-wing parties emphasize ethno-
nationalism, which stems from myths concerning distant past. Furthermore, they endorse 
ethnic homogeneity and traditional values in order to reinforce the nation. Radical right-
wing parties often use populist rhetoric and accuse elites of neglecting the nation in the 
name of internationalism, and putting their own self-interests before the interests of the 
ordinary people. The two core elements that Rydgren (2007) pinpoints based on the 
definition above are: ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism. 
These elements are included to a more general sociocultural authoritarianism that 
emphasizes law, order and family values. (ibid., pp. 242-243.) Rydgren focuses mainly 
on the Western European radical right-wing parties but the definition fits well also to 
Jobbik. 
Populist anti-establishment strategy seems to have played a central role in the success of 
the new radical right-wing parties. Mudde (2004, p. 543) has defined populism as “an 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’”. According to populist 
thinking politics should express the general will of the people (ibid., p. 543). Rydgren 
(2007, p. 245) adds that besides being against the elites, the new radical right-wing parties 
exclude also groups such as immigrants and ethnic minorities from “the pure people”. 
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Mouffe (2005) has argued that when politics become nothing more than consensual 
activity of the elites, it becomes possible for populist parties to take advantage of the 
growing anti-elite sentiments and the lack of political passions. By defining themselves 
as the representatives of “the people”, opposed to the elites, populist parties are able to 
create a strong new “we” that voters can identify with (ibid., pp. 67-70). Therefore, 
Mouffe (2005) sees that political contestation between adversaries is a healthy sign of 
democracy and existence of a vibrant “agonistic” public sphere a prerequisite for such a 
contestation to flourish (ibid., pp. 3-5). If no space is left for such contestation, the 
situation can transform to a moral antagonistic confrontation between good and evil (not 
opposite political ideologies) and the opponent will be seen as an enemy instead of an 
adversary. (pp. 3-5.) In addition, Mouffe (2005) emphasizes the importance of collective 
identities, which always exist through an us/them divide, for democratic confrontation. 
According to her, the scholars promoting liberal rationalism have ignored the affective 
dimension that is mobilized by collective identifications. Forgetting this emotional aspect 
and the role of “passion”, have then led to difficulties to address questions such as the 
character of a “mass” political movements and nationalism. (2005, pp. 5-6.)   
Palonen (2006) has argued that Hungarian political life after the turn of the millennium 
could be described with a term “bi-polar consensus”9. This term grasps well the nature of 
the all-encompassing political frontier between the right and the left that existed in 
Hungary during the first years after the millennium. It can be described as the 
sedimentation of a single frontier and a parallel existence of two camps where “unity 
within ones ‘own’ is based on common difference from the ‘other’” (ibid., p. 249). This 
state of bi-polar consensus differs significantly from the consensual state, which Mouffe 
(2005) saw as a fertile ground for the growth of the right-wing populism. Nevertheless, 
the fact that this frozen confrontation kept the focus of the Hungarian political elites 
fixated on the maintenance of the frontier, created a space for a new political actor to 
arise.  
2.5  Jobbik – popularity and electorate 
Hungarian radical right-wing party Jobbik was originally founded as a Right-Wing Youth 
Association (Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség) in 1999 by a group of university students. In 
2003 the association transformed into a political party, that changed its official name to 
                                                 
9 See also Palonen (2009).  
 16 
Jobbik, The Movement for Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom). 
(Jobbik, 2010a) Since 2006 it has been led by Gábor Vona, who is “espousing an ideology 
that is mixture of Hungarian political and economic nativism, (with a particularly overt 
and extreme anti-Roma element), conspiracy-like anti-Semitic, anti-Communist and anti-
globalization rhetoric, and historical revisionism” (Pytlas, 2013, p. 170).  
Jobbik is often classified as an extreme or radical right-wing party (see e.g. Kovács, 2013; 
Korkut, 2012; Karácsony & Róna, 2010), but the party itself likes to be defined as 
“conservative and radically patriotic Christian party”. Jobbik has named the protection of 
Hungarian values and interests and defending “the nation as the foundation of human 
community” as its main purpose. In addition, Jobbik emphasizes the importance of the 
protection and expansion of national resources. It claims to be the only party that has had 
the courage to address one of the underlying problems of Hungarian society, namely the 
situation of the “ever growing” Roma population. According to Jobbik, when other 
parties have remained silent in the name of political correctness, only they have dared to 
say that “the phenomenon of ‘gypsy crime’ is real”. According to Jobbik, the “gypsy 
crime” (cigánybűnözés) is a distinct form of delinquency, that differs from the crimes 
committed by the majority in nature and force. (Jobbik, 2010a.) 
The rise of the popularity of Jobbik in 2009 and 2010 elections was so phenomenal that 
it caught the attention of many Hungarian political scientists. In recent years, a growing 
body of scientific articles, attempting to identify the reasons behind the growth of 
Jobbik’s popularity, has been published. Next, I introduce the most commonly presented 
arguments.   
First of all, it has been shown in a study based on data of the “Demand for Right-Wing 
Extremism Index” (Derexindex) that the amount of Hungarians who were supporting 
anti-establishment, chauvinistic, xenophobic and authoritarian ideologies of the radical 
right was growing significantly during the years before the 2009 and 2010 elections. 
Based on the collected data the amount of the potential right-wing extremists raised from 
10 % to 21 %. (Krekó, Juhász & Molnár, 2011.) These figures seem to predict well the 
quick growth of Jobbik’s popularity in the elections that followed, but they tell very little 
about the reasons why such attitudes became more common. 
The “Roma issue” has been seen by many scholars as the single most important factor 
behind the success of Jobbik (e.g. Kovács, 2013 and Karácsony & Róna, 2010).  
Nevertheless, it seems that the common anti-Roma attitudes among Hungarians, together 
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with the disappointment towards the political elite, could not alone explain the success of 
radical right. What was needed in addition to these negative sentiments (demand side) 
was a political actor that could meet the needs of the public (supply side), in other words, 
a party that brought the question of “gypsy crime” to the political agenda and appeared 
as an order bringing organization with the help of its paramilitary wing the Hungarian 
Guard (Magyar Gárda). Jobbik was able to present themselves as the most competent 
party to deal with the “gypsy problem” and therefore gained issue-ownership over the 
matter. (Karácsony & Róna, 2010, pp. 54-55.) Also Kovács (2013, p. 225) named the 
politicization of the Roma issues the most significant factor behind the sudden success of 
Jobbik.   
On the other hand, Grajczjár and Tóth (2011) claim that, even if anti-Roma, anti-Semitic 
and xenophobic attitudes can be commonly found among the voters of Jobbik, the most 
significant factor behind Jobbik’s success and the hardened attitudes was the economic 
crisis, which hit Hungary badly in 2008. Together with the scandals that led to the collapse 
of the support of the left-wing government the impact on the society was devastating. 
This caused feelings of insecurity, disorder and fear that made attractive a party that 
offered radical solution and change. (ibid., p. 87.) 
Yet another point of view stresses the importance of the expansion of the internet as the 
key explanatory factor behind Jobbik’s success. Before the 2009 and 2010 elections 
Jobbik was largely closed outside of the mainstream mass media and was therefore driven 
towards alternative solutions to get their message through. Internet turned out to be a 
suitable tool for this purpose. According to Jeskó, Bakó and Tóth (2012), the sudden 
growth of Jobbik’s popularity can be temporally located with the general growth of the 
internet usage in the Hungarian society. In addition, the age structure of the active internet 
users is similar to Jobbik’s supporters’ age structure. (ibid., p. 83.)  
For the first time internet was used in Hungary by a political party as the main channel 
for reaching potential voters, but as Jeskó and his colleagues (2012) emphasize, the 
network of Jobbik related pages is much wider than the number of clearly politics related 
pages. Therefore, we can talk about an emergence of an entire online subculture, which 
covers all the fields of life from online shops of clothes, food and handcrafts to band 
homepages and news portals. This brings significant advantage for Jobbik, since through 
this wide network they are able to reach people who have not earlier been interested in 
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politics. Now, for example, a visitor of a nationalist rock band’s homepage can find 
himself/herself on a page with radical right political contents after a couple of clicks.       
Just like the sudden emergence of Jobbik, the characteristics of their electorate have been 
subject to great interest among the Hungarian scholars. The emergence of Jobbik was a 
surprise for the analysts and researchers since it was considered that Hungarian election 
system and media made it practically impossible for a new political party to become 
successful (Karácsony & Róna, 2010, p. 32). In Hungarian media and political analyses, 
it has been often presented that many of those who voted for Jobbik were disappointed 
former supporters of the left-wing party MSZP. However, Karácsony’s and Róna’s study 
shows that most of the new Jobbik supporters were either previously inactive voters, first 
time voters or those who used to vote for Fidesz. (ibid., p. 46.) 
In addition to analysing Jobbik’s supporters’ earlier voting behaviour, several studies 
have been conducted in order to identify the characteristics of Jobbik electorate. 
Karácsony and Róna (2010, pp. 48-49) come to a conclusion that the most defining 
quality of Jobbik voters is their anti-Roma attitude. Grajczjár and Tóth (2011, pp. 78-79) 
suggest, in line with their economic crisis argument, that the supporters of Jobbik are 
those who were worst hit by the 2008 recession. Rudas, (2010, p. 512) arrives to the 
opposite conclusion and claims that the main reason why people gave their support for 
Jobbik was not economical but ideological. Jobbik, with its radical right-wing values, 
appeared as a solution for people who found it difficult to exist in a society with pluralistic 
values.  
When it comes to the demographic characteristics of Jobbik voters, several studies have 
shown that men and young people are clearly overrepresented (e.g. Kovács, 2013; 
Grajczjár & Tóth, 2011; Rudas, 2010). However, there seem to be significant regional 
differences. Kovács’ (2013) analysis reveals three distinctive groups of Jobbik’s 
supporters. Firstly, student voters that are distributed rather evenly across the country. 
Secondly, unemployed and low income groups in western Hungary, and thirdly, better-
off, employed people in the deprived north-eastern regions of Hungary. With this regional 
division, it is possible to get more accurate picture of the characteristics of the people that 
are forming Jobbik’s electorate. The first group, the students, represents the young and 
well educated strata of the voters. They can be identified as dynamic part of the voters 
including the party activists. The second and third group consists mainly of skilled 
workers, but otherwise the two groups are very different. In the western regions, where 
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the Roma population is low, Jobbik has appealed to those who were strongly affected by 
the economic crisis and the transition. In north-eastern Hungary, where the Roma 
population is considerably bigger, Jobbik has gained voters among the more well-off 
sections of the population. These people often experience status anxiety, i.e. fear of losing 
one’s privileged economic position, due to the deterioration of the region, which is 
blamed on the growing Roma population. (ibid., pp. 229-230.)  
As I mentioned earlier, very few of the studies focusing on Jobbik rely on any 
ethnographic methods or contain a visual component. Therefore, my own research by 
shifting the focus on deconstructing Jobbik’s national day gatherings to their basic 
elements, such as scene, roles, symbols and rituals can bring new insights in 
understanding the phenomenon of “Jobbikian nationhood” and its unforeseen success. 
After this “autopsy” of Jobbik’s gatherings I aim at reconstructing a more complete 
understanding of Jobbik and its supporters, as they present themselves during the national 
days, when the already overt nationalistic component of the party is further emphasised.        
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3 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, I introduce the theoretical approaches that form the framework for 
studying Jobbik’s national day commemorations and celebrations. I begin by defining the 
social constructivism as my epistemological and ontological starting point, which helps 
to position myself in the field of nationalism studies. Keeping this in mind, I proceed by 
defining nationalism and presenting theories that best serve my analysis. From 
nationalism I move towards the study of symbols and rituals, which I find central for 
disentangling the complex net of non-verbal communication that is present in Jobbik’s 
gatherings. Finally, I move to the verbal sphere and introduce the core theoretical 
concepts, such as “collective memory” and “presentism”, which I use for analysing the 
ways in which collective memories and interpretations of past are being re-created and 
reformulated during the national day commemorations.    
In addition, I present several arguments, which suggest that there is a need for studying 
national days and that, at least in the Hungarian context, we are talking of a very complex 
phenomenon with various political actors. I am particularly interested in the production 
and reception of the verbal and non-verbal content in these gatherings. It appears to be 
too simplifying to talk about elite that produces these events and about a mass whose only 
role is to consume them. Therefore, I wish to emphasize the interaction between different 
actors and the active role of the audience. Based on my experiences in Jobbik’s 2013-
2014 gatherings, it seems clear that the audience is deeply involved in producing the 
symbolic content of these events.  
3.1 Epistemological and ontological starting points 
I approach my topic from the perspective of social constructionism. The ontological and 
epistemological stand of social constructionism proposes that our knowledge of the world 
is constructed in the daily interactions between people. As a result, our knowledge is not 
only constructed, but culturally and historically relative and consequently the concepts 
we use are specific for this particular time and place. The strong emphasis on social 
interaction has directed social constructionists’ interests towards processes instead of 
structures. In other words, what has been in focus is how people create and enact their 
knowledge of the world. (Burr, 2015, pp. 4-12.)      
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Practically the entire field of nationalism studies, regardless of whether one presents 
modernist or ethno-symbolist approach, sees nations as social constructs10. Therefore, the 
interest should be shifted towards the questions how and when nations are socially 
constructed (see e.g. Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). From this constructedness follows that 
a nation does not exist constantly (at least not in the same intensity), but consists of certain 
events that serve as its condense points (Feischmidt et al., 2014). In this study I approach 
these questions from an ethnographic, inductive point of view.   
Many constructivist scholars have emphasized discourse analysis as a primary method 
for studying how the social reality is being constructed through discursive i.e. verbal acts. 
Since my focus is on national day gatherings, which are social action with many other 
dimensions besides the verbal, I attempt to understand the social constructing of the world 
as a phenomenon that goes beyond language. I do not view the world as being constructed 
only with verbal means, but in a multisensory way (see for example Pink, 2009). The way 
we see, hear, sense and even smell or taste and otherwise actively engage with the world 
is largely a social construct. This becomes obvious when we think for example of the 
differences in food culture; whether something is considered to smell and taste good 
varies largely just to mention food products such as grasshoppers, camembert cheese, or 
Finnish Easter pudding, mämmi.  
Although I have so far mainly focused on defending my argument on the significance of 
the multisensory nature of social constructionism, I do not intend to ignore the language 
in my study altogether. Instead, I approach the verbal sphere as one of the many 
dimensions of social reality. The elements I concentrate on, demonstrate how “talking the 
nation” (see Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008, p. 538) also constructs the nation and in this 
case more precisely its past and the political divisions within it.  
3.2 Defining nationalism and nationhood 
Nationalism is a complex concept that does not have one generally accepted definition. It 
can be seen as cultural process which connects and unites people, political ideology that 
aims at state formation or a phenomenon similar to religion that offers security and 
communality in a modernising and secularising world (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen, 2005, 
p. 9). One of the most famous researchers of nationalism, Ernest Gellner, defined 
nationalism as “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries 
                                                 
10 The concepts of “modernism” and “ethno-symbolism” are introduced in Chapter 3.2. 
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should not cut across political ones” (1983, p. 1). Since the number of potential nations 
is much greater than that of actual states, ethnic homogeneity can be reached only by 
assimilating, expelling or killing all non-nationals (ibid., p. 2).  
Gellner’s definition is from the 1980´s, that can be viewed as the golden era of the 
nationalism studies. This was a time of great narratives that from a macro-analytical 
perspective ambiguously aimed at giving exhaustive explanation of nationalism. Classical 
works of Gellner (1983), Smith (1986) Breuilly (1994 [1982]), Anderson (2006, [1983]) 
and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992 [1983]) were all published during these years. 
Especially the works of the three first social scientists viewed the nations mainly “from 
above”, but already both Anderson and Hobsbawm and Ranger showed more interest 
towards the ordinary people and nationalism “from below”.  
For Gellner and other modernists, nation is a product of modernization. According to 
Gellner (1983, p. 54), nations can be understood only in relation to the age of nationalism, 
when “educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind 
of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify”. Smith (1999, p. 7), a former 
student of Gellner, has criticized modernists for their lack of interest towards the pre-
modern origins of modern nations and dismissing the traditions, which derive from pre-
modern ethnic and cultural ties. Smith considers essential to understand how nationalism 
gains its emotional appeal and power. For ethno-symbolists, which Smith himself 
represents, the answer is “the myths, memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritages 
and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and 
reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias” (ibid., p. 9). 
Since the 1990s, as a result of the cultural turn of postmodernism, the focus has been 
shifted away from the grand narratives into specific questions of current societal 
developments (Smith, 2008 p. 564). One of the central themes has been the ethnic and 
national identity of people living in multi-ethnic and globalizing societies. These studies 
have often focused on ethnic and national identity from a constructivist approach and it 
is now widely agreed that identities such as these are constructed, contested, multiple and 
fragmented. With no intention of denying this, Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox and Grancea 
(2008, p. 7) express their dissatisfaction with advocates of the constructivist approach. 
According to them, it is now considered commonplace that ethnicity and nationhood are 
constructed, but what is often not specified is: how they are constructed. In addition, the 
authors notify that constructivist claims often go together with nonconstructivist 
 23 
“groupism” i.e. the tendency to assume that ethnic groups and nations are basic 
components of social life and therefore used as units of social analysis. Brubaker and his 
colleagues are proposing a more relational and dynamic approach towards ethnicity and 
nation (ibid., p. 9). According to the authors, ethnicity should be understood as “a way of 
understanding and interpreting experience” whereas nationhood instead of being an 
ethnocultural fact could be seen as “a frame of vision, a cultural idiom, and a political 
claim” (ibid., p. 358). As a result, ethnicity and nationhood appear in multiple forms: 
 They are expressed in ethnopolitical claims, objectified in symbols, 
embedded in institutional structures and organizational routines, encoded in 
elite and popular discourses, embodied in schemas and commonsense 
knowledge, and enacted in public ceremonies and private interactions. 
(Brubaker et al., 2008, p. 358.) 
Brubaker and his colleagues (2008, p. 222) also notify that it is important to pay attention 
to the fact that ethnicity and nationhood can be deliberately emphasized. It is not just the 
observer who seeks signs of nationhood, but the observed who consciously “gives” or 
“gives off” signs of his/her ethnicity (ibid.). As the definition above shows, there are 
various ways in which ethnicity and nationhood can be produced and reproduced. In this 
study my main focus is on nationhood as objectified in symbols, enacted in public 
ceremonies and encoded in elite discourses.  
Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008), take up the challenge and aim in their article to take social 
constructivism seriously by defining how nationhood is constructed from below. They 
specify four ways in which this happens: talking the nation, choosing the nation, 
performing the nation and consuming the nation. “Talking the nation” refers here to the 
discursive acts through which nationhood and nation are constructed in everyday 
interactions. Fox and Miller-Idriss are particularly interested in the moments when this 
talk occurs, in other words, when is the nation. They claim such moments to be for 
example national catastrophes and international sporting events. (ibid., pp. 537-540.) 
Clearly, national day commemorations are such events too, although they give perhaps 
more emphasis to elite’s verbal articulations.   
In a world that is divided into nations, the choices we make often follow national lines. 
Various institutions such as education system and media are structured along these lines. 
“Choosing the nation” in this sense is often unconscious, but becomes more apparent in 
multi-ethnic settings. (Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008, p. 542.) Since in my study I view 
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nationalism as consisting of various competing discourses it is more relevant to look at 
which version of nation and nationhood people choose. Why is there, for example, a need 
for calling a taxi from a company called “the National taxi” (Nemzeti taxi), when all taxi 
drivers are Hungarians? 
Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) include performing the nation in the four ways of which 
nationhood is defined in everyday life. According to them, nationalistic ritual 
performances are part of everyday life not because of the banality of the events, but 
because of the ordinary people that participate in them. They also highlight the ways in 
which the elite designed events’ intended symbolic messages are often mixed or even 
missed. They argue further, that the venue of such performances has changed from 
national commemorations to sporting events. (ibid., pp. 545-547.) Yet, when it comes to 
Hungary, it cannot be said that the national day celebrations have lost their ability to 
attract people’s attention. When I attended the commemorations in years 2013-2014, the 
events organized by the ruling party Fidesz, such as the “Peace march” (Békemenet) on 
23 October, had hundreds of thousands of participants (according to some sources one 
million) and even in Jobbik’s gatherings in October and March there were thousands of 
people (Origo, 23.10.2013). Therefore, in the Hungarian context, it would be short sighted 
to dismiss the importance of national day commemorations. Commemorating three 
different days in events divided by the political lines tells that history is far from being 
“over” in Hungary (see McCrone & McPherson, 2009, p. 3). In addition, it can be argued 
that in western nation states national days have become largely part of the everyday order 
of things and work through it the same way as flags hanging in front of office buildings. 
Banal, but ready to be used and activated if circumstances demand it.  
Lastly, everyday nationhood is approached from the perspective of “consuming the 
nation”. Nations can be viewed as products of standardizing and universalizing processes 
controlled by the states. The role of consuming falls naturally for the citizens, but Fox 
and Miller-Idriss (2008) wish to emphasize their active role as producers of nation 
through the everyday choices of consumption. (ibid., pp. 549-550.) Consumption and 
commodification of the nation is a central aspect in Jobbik’s national day gatherings and 
in the subculture that surrounds the party. Commodification of the national symbols and 
their use for expressing radical national identity is discussed further in Chapter 5.    
I consider the synthesis of approaches that Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) suggest for 
studying construction of nation and nationhood very useful for my own analysis. Talking, 
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choosing, performing and consuming the nationhood, can be all found from the national 
day gatherings of Jobbik. Nonetheless, there are some issues that require further 
consideration. The Nationhood as understood by Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) appears as 
a phenomenon where on the one side there is an elite and/or state on the other the 
“ordinary people”. This rather simplified view has been criticised by Smith (2008). In this 
study I aim at being more sensitive towards the various actors that the “ordinary people” 
consists of, namely party activists, volunteers, passers-by, tourists, vendors (food and 
accessories), and counterdemonstrators. There is not a clear cut division between the elite 
and the people, but various political and civil actors that produce these events together. 
Smith (2008) also demands more attention towards the symbols, memories and myths. 
For him nation is above all a historic continuum which can be understood only through 
the development of nationalist movement and questions such as “why is the nation?” 
(ibid., p. 565). In my own study, symbols, myths and history have a central place. 
However, my goal is not to join the works which main task was to explain the birth of 
nation, but instead to study three specific events during which a particular version of 
nationhood is being constructed.  
3.3 Banal and heated nationalism 
Fox and Miller-Idriss’ approach joins the discussion on everyday nationalism that can be 
also called banal nationalism. This tradition, which emphasizes the habitual and common 
everyday representations of nations, stems from the classical work of Michael Billig. In 
the 1990s Billig criticised researchers of nationalism for failing to notice the banal forms 
of nationalism in established nation states. The same way as these “unwaved flags” 
remained unnoticed by the general public, they were not able to catch the attention of 
sociologists or political scientists either (Billig, 1995, pp. 38-39). According to Billig, 
both academics and people living in established nation states seem to forget these routine 
expressions of nationhood. Instead they think that they live in reasonable world, in the 
“point-zero of nationalism”. (1995, pp. 49-50.) The studies addressing everyday 
nationalism that followed can be seen as an attempt to mend the situation.  
Skey (2006, p. 146) has, however, argued that it seems that Billig (1995, p. 45) himself 
has disregarded the significance of what he calls “conventional carnivals of surplus 
emotion”. While describing in detail processes through which the everyday forms of 
nationalism provide banal reminders or nation and national identity he de-emphasizes the 
importance of national days. Billig (1995, p. 46) concludes that “it seems strange to 
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suppose that occasional events, bracketed off from ordinary life, are sufficient to sustain 
a continuingly remembered national identity”. Without undermining the importance of 
banal nationalism, Skey (2006, p. 146) claims that national days are equally significant 
for producing nationhood because they “illuminate and materialize the often rather 
nebulous solidarities that are presumed to underpin daily (national) life”. He suggests that 
the banal and ecstatic forms of nationalism are better understood as reinforcing each 
other. Just as the banal nationalism makes the ecstatic nationalism meaningful, the 
ecstatic nationalism illuminates the banal by realizing the nation in a concrete form. (ibid., 
pp. 146-148.)     
Here it is important to bring up yet another view point, which is the possibility that 
national day celebrations are not necessarily moments of ecstatic or heated nationalism 
(as Billig and Skey seem to assume), but can instead be seen as approaching the everyday 
sphere of life. Fox (2014) criticizes Billig’s assumption and points out that the masses 
might be more or less indifferent towards the messages that political leaders attempt to 
convey. Yet, Collins (2014) has described moments of truly heated nationalism like the 
months after 9/11 in the USA. I suggest that the national holidays are truly heated 
nationalism only if the current political situation invites people to feel strongly about the 
particular historical moment that is being commemorated. Because that is what national 
days often are: commemorations of the moments of heated nationalism in the past.  
National day commemorations can normally raise only a pale image of the fever that was 
present during the historical moment. However, sometimes the commemorations offer an 
opportunity, for a group that is gathered, to “hijack” the event and raise the current 
problems to the centre of the attention (Collins, 2014, p. 60). This “hijacking” happened 
in Hungary in 2006 during the 50th anniversary commemoration of 1956 revolution. 
Besides the official state commemorations, various opposition and protest groups had 
gathered around the city. Demonstrators who were protesting against the government and 
demanding the resigning of the socialist party prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány managed 
to mobilize more people drawing from the revolutionary spirit of the 1956 memory. Many 
protestors identified themselves with the 1956 freedom fighters, whereas the socialist 
government was seen as the successor of the state socialist regime. To underline the 
parallel, a tank from 1956 set on display close to Deák square was taken over and driven 
by one of the demonstrators towards the riot police.  
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Later the happenings of 2006 have been included to the content of 1956 commemorations 
especially by Jobbik, whose members were particularly active in the demonstrations. This 
moment has been so decisive for formation and success of Jobbik that those who took 
part in the demonstrations are called “2006 generation” (see e.g. Krekó & Mayer, 2015). 
The events of 2006 made it possible for younger generations to identify with the historical 
moment of 1956 and therefore the commemorations are still capable of raising rather 
heated emotional response. According to Krekó and Mayer (2015) the fall 2006 
functioned as the point of awakening for the radical right as the riots offered them 
maximum public visibility and a possibility to benefit from the victim position.  
3.4 National day commemorations  
Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor 
in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often 
constitutes a danger for nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light 
deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, 
even of those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. (Renan, 
1990 [1882], p. 11.) 
Nation’s collective memory can be seen as a process of selective remembering and active 
forgetting (Brubaker, 2006, pp. 161-162). The concept was first introduced by Maurice 
Halbwachs in Social Frameworks of Memory (1925). According to Halbwachs (1992 
[1925]), to truly understand memory one should not try to trace back its location in human 
brain, because memories are recalled externally in various social frameworks. Following 
this line of thought, it can be said that people both acquire and recall their memories 
usually in society and “it is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social 
frameworks of memory” (ibid., p. 38). In his later essays published posthumously under 
the name The Collective Memory, Halbwachs (1980 [1950], p. 86) concludes, that 
collective memory “provides the group a self-portrait that unfolds through time”. This 
shared memory of the group’s own past allows it to recognize itself and view the own 
group distinct and unique in comparison to other groups (ibid., p. 86-87). 
However, collective memory should not be seen as an alternative to history. It is best 
understood as being shaped by history (or historical memory) and by commemorative 
symbolism and ritual. (Schwartz’ interview in Olick & Robbins, 1998, p. 112.) The acts 
of commemoration reproduce “commemorative narratives”, in other words, stories about 
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the past events that are the reason for these ritualized remembrances (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 
6). These remembrances can be seen as occasions when the narratives are delivered to the 
masses (see e.g. Podeh, 2011) or “the masses” can be seen as a more independent actor 
whose responses and own initiatives should be paid more attention to (see e.g. Brubaker, 
2008; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008).  
People’s yearning for nostalgia and permanence provides an excellent opportunity for 
politicians to combine elements of history and collective memory with their own political 
agenda. I am particularly interested in a line of study called “presentism” that emphasizes 
the idea that the past is actually produced in the present and therefore malleable (Olick & 
Robbins, 1998). Brubaker (2006, p. 161) describes this process of producing the past as 
an interaction between powerful cultural objects of past and interpreters (often 
politicians) in present. He claims, that within the last two decades “commemorations – 
and social memory generally – have emerged as a fruitful site for studying this interactive 
production of meaning” (ibid., p. 161). Olick and Robbins (1998, p. 128) distinguish 
between instrumental and meaning dimensions of presentism. The former refers to 
manipulative “memory entrepreneurship” for present purposes, whereas the latter refers 
to an understanding according to which selective memory is a natural result of interpreting 
the world around us (ibid.). In my analysis of the speeches held in the national day 
gatherings, I describe how Jobbik is using the means of instrumental presentism to justify 
their current policies and position in the political field.  
Collective commemorations rely on the idea of shared memories. These memories are 
then renewed and new ones created in national day gatherings. Elgenius defines national 
days in the following way:  
National days honour, as a rule, founding myths and official national 
narratives that glorify nationhood in terms of oneness. National days are 
designed in such a way that they perpetuate notions of sameness and of a 
shared experience. (Elgenius, 2011, p. 95.) 
National days along with national symbols can be seen as markers of nation building. 
They are also significant in making the nation visible. Introducing of a certain flag, 
anthem and a national day makes the nation building process perceivable. Elgenius 
stresses the importance of symbols and ceremonies that some scholars have considered 
of secondary interest and mainly decorative. (Elgenius, 2011, pp. 1-2.) Especially the 
modernists have neglected the symbols and ceremonies as part of the world of myths and 
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legends. Elgenius, however, argues that “symbolism is, as far as nationhood is considered 
as important as economic and political factors” (Elgenius, 2007, p. 77). Focusing on 
ceremonies and symbols can bring new insights to three nationhood related processes: 
self-reference (who we are), differentiation (us in relation to others) and recognition (the 
struggle for affirmation) (Elgenius, 2011, p. 2). The power of ceremonies and symbols 
lies also in repetition; the members of a nation are regularly reminded of their membership 
and its boundaries (ibid., p. 3).    
According to McCrone and McPherson (2009), national celebrations serve two central 
purposes: firstly, they act as a memorial device and secondly, reinforce the “we feeling” 
within the members of the nation. Nevertheless, in some countries there are competing 
national days and their content remains contested. The meaning of a certain national day 
can also change depending on the current political regime. (Ibid., p. 1.) Furthermore, the 
past events that are not celebrated can be equally interesting as those that are. The reason 
not to celebrate a certain day may be because the day would exclude some groups of the 
nation or be too problematic, as McCrone and McPherson put it: history may not be “over 
enough” (ibid., p. 3). 
The political situation and the characteristics of a particular state have a huge impact on 
the forms the national day commemorations take. Podeh (2011, p.15) introduces four 
different types of commemoration: 1) consensual commemoration (homogeneous 
societies), 2) multivocal commemoration (diverse views, shared remembrance), 3) 
imposed and controlled commemoration (forced univocal narrative), 4) fragmented 
commemoration (multiple narratives, ceremonies held at diverse times and in assorted 
places). Hungary seems to fit best to the fourth type: fragmented commemoration, since 
the commemorations are organized in several locations and supporters of different parties 
do not intermingle. According to Podeh (2011, p.15), this kind of commemoration can be 
usually found in heterogeneous societies with weak central government, this is, however, 
not the case in Hungary. Instead, the fragmentation appears to derive from deep political 
divisions in an otherwise rather homogenous society. 
Hungary with its three national day celebrations (15 March, 20 August and 23 October), 
which are commemorated in politically fragmented groups, appears to be an exceptionally 
complex case among nation states. Nyyssönen (2008) has studied how the various 
political traditions are maintained in Hungary and celebrated during the national days. 
According to Nyyssönen (2008, p. 169), “the debates on historical anniversaries reflect 
 30 
different mythical accounts of Hungarian history that had been neglected and distorted 
by the communist regime”. The end of the communist era made it possible to celebrate 
again the national days. This did not result only in renewed celebrations, but also lead to 
contestation and politicisation of the three national days (ibid.). Nyyssönen (2008) states, 
that the political polarisation of the past years (between the Fidesz and earlier ruling 
socialist party MSZP) has had a greater impact on the character of the celebrations than 
the status of the days themselves. Consequently, these group identities in the making have 
led to monopolising tendencies and difficulties in commemorating together. (2008, p. 
182.)  
3.5 Rituals, symbols and their role in national day gatherings 
In the following subchapters I introduce the central characteristics of rituals and symbols 
and some viewpoints of their role in constructing collective national identity and 
nationhood. National day celebrations can be seen as rituals, which are illustrative 
examples of the ways in which nations are socially constructed. Unlike during everyday 
interactions, during rituals this character of our reality becomes hard to ignore. Geertz has 
described well this particular quality of rituals. According to him, ritual behaviour can be 
seen as a story that the people i.e. the society tell themselves about themselves (Geertz, 
1973, p. 448). This takes us back to the reasons why such acts should be approached from 
multisensory perspective, as Banks puts it:    
Precisely because this ‘story’ is acted, not merely understood or held as a 
mental representation, meant that investigators had to consider the full 
‘performance’ of social action – oral, visual, gestural – including the feelings 
and emotions of those involved. (Banks, 2007, p. 22.)  
Banks summarises insightfully what I consider to be the key for understanding social 
performances such as national day commemorations. In my own research I emphasise the 
role of rituals and symbols in the enactment of this self-referential “story”.    
Rituals that create solidarity 
There has been recently a growing interest in studying nationalism from the ritual and 
performance point of view, which stems from the Durkheimian tradition. These 
researchers draw influences from Durkheim’s classical work Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life (1964 [1912]), in which he studied what he assumed to be the simplest 
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forms of social organization he could find: totemism among the Australian aboriginals. 
Durkheim, came to the conclusion that rituals play a key role in producing and 
maintaining solidarity in communities. (Durkheim, 1964, pp. 205-223.) After the World 
War II many neo-Durkheimian anthropologists applied Durkheim’s findings of religious 
rituals of small pre-industrial societies on post-war western societies. In these studies, 
nationalism was seen as a secular religion and nation as a subject of worship. They were, 
however, criticized for ignoring the differences of modern western societies and small 
pre-modern communities. (Tsang & Woods, 2014, pp. 2-8.) The currently emerging 
interest towards rituals in nationalism studies has been greatly influenced by Durkheimian 
analysis and by the interdisciplinary field of performance studies. There is, nevertheless, 
a significant difference compared to the post-war studies, since the scholars do not assume 
anymore, that the responses to national rituals would be uniform, on contrary, they are 
assumed to be varying and contested (ibid., pp. 9-10).  
One of the few anthropologists studying rituals in modern states in the 1980s was David 
Kertzer, who emphasised in his writings the importance and the power rituals have in 
politics. According to Kertzer (1988), it is through rituals that leaders assert their right to 
rule. Therefore, rituals bear great significance in modern politics and political leaders are 
literally surrounded by them. (ibid., pp. 1-2.) Kertzer defines ritual in the following way: 
“[ritual is] symbolic behavior that is socially standardized and repetitive” (ibid., p. 9). 
Through symbols important meanings are attached to the behaviour and feelings of 
continuity between past, present and future can be created with repetition. It is also 
important to remember that rituals do not have only cognitive effect on people, but they 
cause strong emotional responses. People participate in rituals, because they gain feelings 
of satisfaction in doing so. (ibid., pp. 9-11.)    
Kertzer’s (1988) aim is to explain how rituals can produce solidarity even in conflict 
situations and why consensus of thought is not required. Developing Durkheim’s thoughts 
further, he suggests that through ritual people express their social dependence, and that 
what is crucial in this regard, is common participation and emotional involvement, not 
sharing the same values and beliefs. (ibid., pp. 66-67.) In a complex modern society there 
are various political groups that can use rituals for their own purposes. In these cases, 
solidarity does not necessarily expand to the wider society and therefore some of the 
groups can be seen as an outsider, a threat or even an enemy. Kertzer (1988, p. 69) points 
out that this does not undermine in any way the importance that rituals have for political 
groups and for nation building. Also Breuilly (1994) has emphasised the importance of 
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rituals and symbols for nationalist groups and movements. According to Breuilly (1994, 
p. 64) they make the nationalist ideas more tangible “by projecting certain images and by 
enabling people to come together in ways which seem directly to express the solidarity 
of the nation”. National symbols are especially useful in this because of their self-
referential quality (ibid.).        
Since the beginning of the new millennium cultural sociologists have showed a growing 
interest towards rituals. According to Giesen (2006), social theory, in the footsteps of 
Erving Goffman and Victor Turner, is taking a performative turn. This focus on social 
performance over the meaning and narration, or rituals over the myth is emphasising the 
doing side of our social reality. Giesen (2006, p. 326-329) takes as his starting point 
Durkheim’s sacred – profane opposition. In this context sacred is seen as a reference to 
the social community and its collective identity. The moments when something 
extraordinary happens, “the moments of epiphany” (ibid., p. 343), or in Collins’ (2014, 
p. 54) words “time-bubbles of nationalism” are instances when we are in contact with the 
sacred. These moments form the core content of the nations or groups collective memory, 
which just like individual memory, consists above all of significant past events instead of 
the banal everyday activities (Giesen, 2006, pp. 330, 337). Already Connerton (1989) has 
paid attention to this specific character of collective commemorations, which according 
to him differs from other rituals in their explicit reference to past (prototypical) persons 
and events. What is characteristic for this kind of rituals is the ritual re-enactment of the 
past (Connerton, 1989, p. 61). Connerton sees this type of re-enacting as inherently 
contradicting with modern way of life, which emphasises constant change and capital 
accumulation. Therefore, it seems that ritual re-enactment with strong sense of mythical 
identification can no longer be reached in what Connerton calls “historically new semi-
ritual practices”. These modern rituals, seem to serve nowadays the purpose of (false) 
reassuring the participants of permanence in a nostalgic mood. (ibid., 61-64.)      
Connerton (1989), drawing from the collective memory tradition, comes in his writings 
close to the views presented by Giesen (2006). While Giesen (2006) emphasises the 
performative nature of rituals, Connerton (1989) approaches rituals as a part of the bodily 
social memory. He does not see rituals only as an alternative medium for presenting 
certain shared narratives, but also as something essentially distinctive, so that “certain 
things can be expressed only in ritual” (Connerton 1989, p. 54). For example, a myth can 
be told without accepting its content, but its ritual performance is not mere repetition, “it 
is a cult enacted” (Connerton, 1989, p. 70). Rituals present themselves through 
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performative language such as oaths, vows, blessing and curses as well as in bodily 
postures, gestures and movements (ibid., 58-59).    
Giesen (2006, p. 339) distinguishes three types of performative acts: constitutive rituals, 
theatrical performances and moral dramas. Constitutive rituals are events that create 
social reality through re-enactment of past moments of epiphany. Unlike the original 
extraordinary event, rituals do not shatter the social order anymore, on the contrary, they 
are a way to cope with the disorder and integrate the past event as part of the order. This 
making of order happens through embodied performance. Also Jenkins (2011, p.147) 
refers to the bodily aspect of rituals, such as flag usage, by stating that it is something that 
one “learns in the body”. These bodily acts do not always translate easily to written and 
spoken language, which is why Jenkins uses the term “inarticulating the nation” (ibid., p. 
144).  
Unlike constitutive rituals, theatrical performances require an audience besides the 
performing actors. The audience’s role is to observe and evaluate the performance as well 
as embody the society. Theatrical performances, just like rituals, are events that aim at 
presenting something extraordinary that opens possibility for encountering the sacred i.e. 
the collective identity. The audience is most of the time aware of the nature of these events 
as illusions, but momentarily this artificial reality can be experienced as more intensive 
and real than the non-theatrical reality. Even in theatrical performances, the audience does 
not have entirely passive role, since the performances need to be framed by rituals such 
as clapping hands and cheering or sitting in respective silence. (Giesen 2006, pp. 345-
347.) 
According to Giesen (2006), political performances have characteristics of both rituals 
(ceremonies, parades and memorial days) and theatrical performances (appearances, 
processions, gatherings and staging authority through monuments). There is, however, a 
third element that is particularly visible in politics: the quest for authenticity. Giesen 
(ibid., p. 350) names those performances where the question of authenticity is raised as 
moral dramas. Unlike theatrical performances, where the staged illusion is expected, 
moral dramas are characterised by suspicion and distrust. As a response politicians focus 
in their performances more on the tone of their performance, whereas the content is not 
so central. Emphasising emotions and using body language makes the performance seem 
more genuine. In addition, politicians like to present themselves as one of the people and 
this way blur the line between actors and the audience or leader and followers. Usually it 
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is the person’s willingness to confirm this illusion of authenticity that separates followers 
from the outsiders. (ibid., pp. 355-356.) 
Symbols that create a sense of belonging  
As it has become clear in the previous sub-chapter, it is impossible to talk about rituals 
without referring to symbols. Rituals are closely linked to the symbolic sphere and it is 
symbols that form the content of rituals through which political reality is largely created. 
Actually, the nation has no true existence without symbolism. (Kertzer, 1988, pp. 2-11.) 
Giesen (2006) agrees on the crucial importance of symbols, which he defines as the 
visible representations of the community itself: they make the imagined community (see 
Anderson, 2006) visible through objects such as flag or coat of arms. (Giesen. pp. 333-
334). Rituals, on the other hand, are needed so that symbols can be filled with emotional 
significance. In the words of Jenkins (2008, p. 175), “Ritual can invest the symbols of 
organisational membership – flags, uniforms, logos, songs – with an affective weight that 
transcends occasion or ceremony”.  
Shared symbols embody varied meanings condensed in them throughout the history, but 
they can also mean different things to different people (Jenkins, 2011 p. 126). Since 
symbols, such as flags, are often abstract and ambiguous, the meanings attached to them 
are not tied to what they “stand for”. This nature of symbols makes it possible for people 
to have common experiences without needing to explore their differences (ibid., p. 127). 
According to Kertzer (1988, p. 69), the key for understanding how rituals create solidarity 
without the consensus of beliefs is the ambiguity of the symbols that are present in the 
rituals. He names flags as an example. Flags, just like many other symbols, have three 
important qualities 1) they condensate the meanings attached to them, 2) they are 
multivocal and 3) ambiguous (ibid., p.11). These qualities make it possible for varying 
beliefs to exist among each other without open confrontation. Consequently, this 
imagined commonness results in actual commonness: through it people do indeed come 
to have something in common. In other words, this assumed similarity is a construction, 
but it is “socially real”. (Jenkins, 2011 p. 132-140, see also Anderson, 2006.) In Jenkins’ 
words, “it’s in and out of what people do that shared sense of things and a shared symbolic 
universe emerge” (ibid., p. 138).    
Flags are one of the most important and visible national symbols and therefore central for 
my analysis of symbols present in Jobbik’s gatherings. Despite their significance and 
emotional power flags have not been studied much in research on nationalism (Eriksen, 
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2007, pp. 1-2). Flags can be compared in their function and meaning to totems in 
traditional societies. Just like totems, they can help us to make sense of the social reality 
which we are part of. (ibid., p. 3, see also Lévi-Strauss, 1962.) Flags as well as many other 
ritual symbols are so called condensed symbols (Turner, 1967). This means that flags are 
able to contain various meanings and emotions attached to them. According to Firth 
(1973), flags can also be used to convey attitudes and sentiments with simple acts such 
as waving. Flags complex connection to nationhood and emotional potential allows them 
to be used as rallying points for political action (ibid., p.77).   
Eriksen (2007) has listed some common denominators necessary for flags that should 
function as a basis for identification in modern and diverse societies. Firstly, the shared 
identity cannot be based on the flag only. Secondly, in order to be able to contain various 
meanings the flag should be an empty vessel, if the flag is associated primarily with a 
specific group, for example a political party, it will be divisive instead of uniting. And 
thirdly, the ambiguity and inclusiveness of the flag must end at the borders. There should 
be no uncertainty considering which side you are on. Therefore, it can be said that flags 
are both multivocal and boundary-marking. (ibid., pp. 4-5.) 
According to Kolstø (2006), the role of the flag is central for the formation of national 
unity, but in insecure nations they sometimes fail to fulfil this function. This is common 
in new nation states or states that are undergoing a political transition. (ibid., pp. 678-
679.) Also, in secure nation states different political actors shake the established sense of 
unity. For example, extreme right-wing parties have tried to monopolise the use of 
national flags in various European countries. Their success depends greatly on how the 
flag is used in the society in general. According to Eriksen (2007, p. 4), this kind of 
monopolising would not have been possible for example in Norway, since the national 
flag was already present everywhere, whereas in Sweden where use of the national flag 
was less common, the neo-Nazis were able to momentarily appropriate the use of it.  
Studying Jobbik’s gatherings provides excellent opportunities for observing the party’s 
and its supporters’ use of symbols and their participation in rituals. Especially the rich 
flag symbolism is central part of constructing the image of the Jobbikian nationhood. The 
intertwined nature of Jobbik’s party symbolism and national symbolism makes studying 
the complex visual sphere and its simultaneously uniting and dividing character 
extremely interesting extremely interesting. Next I introduce the methods I use for 
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answering how nationalism is constructed, articulated and performed during Jobbik’s 
national day gatherings by using visual, ritual and verbal means. 
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4 Methodology 
In this chapter I introduce the methodology I used during my data collection and the 
consequent analysis. First I present my research material, which I have collected during 
three field trips to Hungary in August and October 2013 and in March 2014. The data 
collection methods I use are based on ethnographic methods, to be precise, participant 
observation and visual ethnography. The material consists firstly of photographs and 
video clips taken during the national day gatherings, secondly of field notes written during 
and after the gatherings and thirdly transcriptions of the speeches held by Jobbik’s 
leaders. I have transcribed two complete speeches of Jobbik leader Gábor Vona and 
sections of various other speeches held during the national day gatherings, with special 
emphasis on audience interaction (commenting, yelling, clapping hands etc.).  
My consequent analysis is based on the observations, qualitative photo analysis and the 
thematic reading of speeches are largely based on the theoretical concepts and 
classification that I have presented in Chapter 3. In addition, I apply specific analytical 
tools and approaches, which are presented in Chapter 4.3. During the party gatherings my 
main focus was on recording the visual material and I only made short notes in the events. 
The actual field notes and photo descriptions I wrote after the gatherings. My visual field 
material consists of 125 photos and 24 short videos, from which I have chosen for further 
analysis 47 photos and 7 film stills. About these photos and stills I wrote picture analysis, 
which, together with the pictures, form three photo essays (one for each gathering I 
observed) (see Jenkins, 2011). As supplementary material I have used videos and photos 
from the events that were available online. In addition, I have followed the media 
coverage of the events both in mainstream media and alternative media close to Jobbik, 
such as: Alfahír, Hazai pálya, Kuruc info, Bar!kád and Nemzeti1TV. My aim is to 
produce a visual ethnographic representation of Jobbik’s gatherings. 
4.1 Ethnographic approach as a methodological starting point 
In Chapter 3 I have outlined rather extensively my theoretical framework. It is, however, 
not just what is studied i.e. national days, rituals and symbols, but how they are being 
studied. The dominant focus within the study of nationalism has been from above, 
whereas the view from below has been seen as difficult and problematic (Fox, 2014). 
Recently researchers with particularly thought-provoking ideas have emphasised the 
importance of “bottom-up” perspective. For example, Brubaker and colleagues (2008, 
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xiv) state that: “from above it is far too easy to ‘see’ bounded and homogenous ethnic 
groups, to whom common interests, perceptions, intentions, and volition can be 
attributed”. Similarly, Fox (2014), who has studied national commemorations in various 
occasions, argues that: “neither their design nor deployment alone provide a measure of 
the ways in which such events are received by their intended audiences” (ibid., p. 38). 
Ethnographic research has always embraced inductive, “from below” perspective that 
allows the researcher to experience the topic studied from the grass root level. 
Ethnographic methods have been used repeatedly for studying rituals (starting from 
classics such as Durkheim, 1964 [1912]; Turner, 1969; Geertz, 1973; Lévi-Strauss, 1962) 
and offer, therefore, excellent tools for approaching the national day celebrations from a 
ritual point of view. Based on previous research (e.g. Skey, 2006; Brubaker et al., 2008; 
Fox, 2014; Jenkins, 2011) I consider national day celebrations and commemorations, 
along with studies of everyday nationalism, as such occasions that ethnographic methods, 
such as participant observation, can be successfully applied. 
Positioning myself in the field 
When planning my own research, it was clear to me, that as a Finn (although with years 
of experience with Hungary and Hungarians), I needed to personally attend the national 
day gatherings I wished to analyse. In my opinion, articles and videos made by others just 
cannot provide the same kind of in-depth, first-hand knowledge. This is particularly the 
case when dealing with radical right-wing party Jobbik, that has been outright demonized 
in many writings in Hungary and especially abroad. This is not to say, that my own 
preconceptions would not have been very negative, they were, and that is exactly one of 
the reasons why I wanted to experience these events first hand. Many studies dealing with 
the radical right rely on surveys, different kinds of media sources or other written 
materials such as party programmes (see e.g. Chapter 2.5). Sociologists Kathleen Blee 
(2007) has pointed out the lack of ethnographic studies concerning radical right and 
emphasises the importance of such research for a more in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon.       
It comes perhaps as no surprise that the radical right is such a phenomenon that many 
prefer to study it from a distance. In my own work, after speaking with my supervisors, I 
chose to conduct my fieldwork during the public Jobbik party gatherings held during the 
three Hungarian national days. This option allowed me easy access to the field and an 
excellent opportunity to observe first-hand how Jobbik’s version of Hungarian 
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nationhood and nationalism is constructed. Studying Jobbik’s gatherings during national 
days seemed also a compact enough frame for a Master’s Thesis theme, which admittedly 
needed some narrowing down. I knew that since my study focuses only on three specific 
days, it does not fill all the criteria of a traditional ethnographic research. Nevertheless, 
my study aims at forming a holistic picture of these particular events and people are 
studied as members of a social group. In addition, the material is collected with several 
ethnographic techniques (see Angrosino’s, 2007, p. 15). I also wish to emphasise that 
before conducting this research I had long conversations about the theme of my study 
with several Hungarians living both in Finland and in Hungary, including two preliminary 
theme interviews, which made me convinced of the significance of the topic. What comes 
to my own position, my regular visits to Hungary, active following of local and 
international news concerning the Hungarian society and living already over a decade 
with a Hungarian spouse made it possible for me to view the events both from inside and 
outside, from a position in-between Finland and Hungary. 
The messy reality of fieldwork 
What makes studying social reality (and apparently reality beyond social as well) both 
extremely frustrating and fascinating, is its tendency to change constantly. Carefully 
made research plans need to be re-evaluated when the world decides to turn a deaf ear to 
you. During my ethnography courses I was often told that when going to the field you 
could prepare as much as you want, but you never knew how things would turn out. When 
the events that you are going to study have not yet occurred, nobody knows what will 
happen. A meteorite could fall from the sky or a snowstorm could stop the functioning of 
the entire country. The latter is what happened during my first field trip to Hungary (see 
Picture 2 and Picture 3).  
My original plan was to study national day gatherings in March, August and October 
2013. Due to a wholly exceptional snowstorm the March 15 observation had to be 
postponed a year and done in March 2014. Another surprise was Jobbik leader Gábor 
Vona’s sudden decision to abandon the party’s radical rhetoric during the Autumn 2013, 
which made it more difficult to analyse Jobbik’s anti-Semitic and xenophobic tendencies 
that were earlier not disguised in same extent (Nemzeti1TV, 21.6.2014). Since my focus 
is on the visual and verbal expressions of nationalism, I put from the beginning a lot of 
emphasis on collecting visual and audio-visual material. I view my photos and short 
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videos as visual field notes, through which I could catch situations such as marching, 
waving flags and chanting that are hard to illustrate with written field notes only.  
  
Observing or participating and observing? 
Although the event was advertised as a family day and even if there were lot 
of kids around, I immediately got cold shivers when I saw two bald headed 
men and a man dressed in the Hungarian guard dress holding the giant flag 
with red and white stripes. This was the first time I saw Hungarian guard 
members in a gathering and I felt that everyone will immediately realize that 
I’m a foreigner or just otherwise in a wrong place. […]  
In any other circumstances I would have run away right after the host started 
the event by saying that we are among our supporters and shouting the Jobbik 
slogan: “Adjon az Isten!” (May God grant it!) and the audience answering: 
“Szebb jövőt!” (Brighter future!) But now I stayed and was sitting very still 
next to an older man who was gesturing his agreement with the speakers and 
clapping his hands enthusiastically. Something I had not thought before: How 
to react when others are clapping hands for example for Russia’s anti-gay 
policies? Well, I just tried to be invisible. (Field notes, 20 August gathering.)  
The above two sections describe my feelings in the very beginning of my first successful 
field trip in August. It shows that despite of my preparations I was caught off guard. I had 
planned that I would try to remain rather neutral while attending the events, but in reality 
it turned out to be impossible: in the middle of an audience, where everyone else is 
clapping their hands, not clapping is already a statement. After the confusion I felt in the 
Picture 2 Budapest, 12 March, 2013 Picture 3 On the highway M1 towards Budapest, 15 
March, 2013 (photo by Anna Windberg) 
 41 
beginning I decided that I would not act in any situation against my own moral views. I 
would not clap hands for anti-gay statements or laugh for a racist joke, but I would stay 
at my place and listen to what the speakers had to say.  
I was reflecting a lot on my researcher position in the gatherings before and during the 
three field trips to Budapest. I felt that physically I was observing the events from the 
vantage point of any regular participant. It also shows in the photos I have taken: most of 
them are taken in the middle of the crowd and catch the visual environment encountered 
by an average participant. All the events were also attended by journalists, photographers 
and cameramen. Therefore, occasionally, when for example filming the marches from the 
side walk, I identified more with the members of the press. During the gatherings I did 
nothing to conceal what I was doing, i.e. making notes and taking photos, but I did not 
wear any “researcher patch” either. In line with what I wrote above about my relation to 
clapping hands I did not agree to wear or hold any party affiliated items. Even if I did not 
try to actively engage into conversation with the audience, small interactions did happen, 
although mainly with the organizers.    
When I arrived to Kodály körönd -square the Abasári Kórus (choir) was just 
singing on the stage. The choir is formed of pensioner men and women and 
their repertoire consists mainly of cheerful military songs. People were 
gathering to the place and party activists were giving the audience Jobbik 
balloons in the national colours of Hungary: red, white and green. They also 
asked me if I would like to have one, but I kindly refused. (Field notes, 15 
March gathering.)  
Doing research during “the smart phone era”, a time when almost anyone in the audience 
possesses the necessary tools for recording visual data, can lead to interesting situations 
where one’s position in the field needs to be re-evaluated. While browsing the video 
material of 20 August gathering I ran in to a YouTube video, where I suddenly noticed 
myself in the focus of the camera and even zoomed in from behind. This moment, when 
the observer suddenly becomes the observed, was definitely an eye opener for me.  
Due to various reasons, such as the setting of the research (the amount of the participants 
in the events varied from several hundreds to thousands), my own safety (in the audience 
there were people that could be clearly identified as neo-Nazis, whose attitudes towards 
a foreign researcher could not be predicted) and the focus on the use of nationalist 
symbols, such as flags and coat of arms, resulted in a situation where some typical 
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ethnography related themes, such as gaining rapport or access to the field, did not play a 
role in my study. One criticism towards my method could be that it does not give voice 
to the supporters of Jobbik. On the other hand, research relying mainly on interviews can 
be criticised for focusing too much on what is said, instead of what is actually done. Here 
is one more example of how participant observation gives the researcher possibility to 
encounter the multisensory reality of their research topic.  
I must admit that the moment when all the red, white and green balloons were 
freed with dramatic uplifting music rising with the balloons, I was for a 
moment emotionally touched. At that moment I felt that I understood a little 
why people choose to attend such events and what is the reward that they can 
possibly receive from doing so. (Field notes, 15 March gathering.) 
4.2 Visual ethnography and using visual data in qualitative research 
Visual sociology and visual anthropology are grounded in the idea that valid 
scientific insight in society can be acquired by observing, analyzing, and 
theorizing its visual manifestations: behaviour of people and material 
products of culture (Pauwels, 2010, p. 546).  
Collecting visual data from the field has long traditions especially in anthropology, but 
also within some sociological traditions (Banks, 2007, p. 37). This can be seen as one 
aspect of ethnographic method that embraces a holistic approach or a specific sub-field 
within ethnography. Pink defines ethnography as a research that “should account not only 
for the observable, recordable realities that may be translated into written notes and texts, 
but also for objects, visual images, the immaterial and the sensory nature of human 
experience and knowledge” (2007, p. 22).  
In recent years, visual methods have become increasingly popular, but the methodological 
basis supporting such research has remained rather weak (Pauwels, 2010). In order to 
remedy the situation Pauwels has developed a framework for visual social research. In 
what follows, I position my own visual method within this framework. Firstly, the visuals 
used in my study are researcher-produced as opposed to using pre-existing artefacts. The 
benefits of this approach are that the researcher has more knowledge of the context and 
more control over the data gathering and, therefore, better insight to the whole production 
(ibid., pp. 550-551). Secondly, the subject of my study is Jobbik’s national day gatherings 
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that are human social behaviour with a clear visual dimension. These gatherings can be 
seen as consisting of rituals that according to Pauwels (2010, p. 554), may benefit from a 
visual approach since it has the capacity to catch the richness and complexity inherent to 
such events. Thirdly, the material has been collected with a smart phone and it consists 
of photos and video clips. My collection method is close to what Pauwels (2010, pp. 561-
562) calls explorative research and “opportunistic sampling” where things that attract a 
researcher’s attention are recorded. This process is of course guided by the thematic focus 
that draws from the initial research questions and theoretical starting points. Lastly, 
Pauwels (ibid., pp. 563-564) elaborates on the degree of involvement, which can vary 
from zero-state involvement to collaboration and joint-production with the research 
participants. In my research there was very little involvement, although the camera use 
was fully overt. It could be said that due to the nature of the event (a mass gathering) the 
audience was probably mainly unaware of my camera use, but generally aware of the 
presence of cameras, since such events are recorded by press and audience likewise.  
All in all, it can be said that the methodology for producing and processing visual data 
still needs to be developed further. Nevertheless, visual methods offer a vast potential for 
studying what people do instead of studying what they say they do. In addition, visual 
representations can be indispensable in expressing the unspeakable and unquantifiable. 
(Pauwels, 2010, pp. 570-575.) One such topic with a strong visual dimension is 
nationhood and national symbols, as has been argued also by Jenkins (2008, 2011) and 
Spencer (2011). Social anthropologist Richard Jenkins (2011) has used photos to 
communicate his research on national symbols, mainly the Danish flag Dannebrog. His 
photo essays combined with sociologist insights on the use of, and the meanings attached 
to, national symbols confirm my initial assumption that symbols and rituals can be studied 
using visual methods. Also Spencer (2011) raises national identity as a theme that could 
be examined with the help of visual research. According to him, “because much of 
‘identity work’ occurs within representation, it ought to be possible to capture some 
manifestations of identity in visual form” (ibid., p. 110). In line with this, Spencer 
suggests that visual means can be used for recording manifestations of national identity, 
such as flags and other nationalist symbols (ibid., p. 111).   
4.3 Tools and approaches for the analysis  
Every research consists of a unique combination of a specific setting, approach and 
theory. Therefore, the methods used for the analysis need to be selected and tailored 
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considering the particular study. In this sub-chapter I first introduce the analytical tools I 
use for arranging the versatile empirical material and then explain how I analyse the visual 
material i.e. photos and film stills as well as the speeches.       
Identifying the central elements of a national day commemoration  
I have used Hungarian sociologist’s, György Csepeli’s list of requisites for rituals and 
ceremonial occasions that activate identity, as a guide for directing my attention while 
doing the observations and for structuring my analysis. Firstly, it is important to select a 
suitable scene for the gathering (open or large space), secondly, the roles among 
participants can be distinguished (speaker, presidium, choir, technical staff, audience, 
passers-by), thirdly, these events involve non-contingency of interactions (choreography, 
procession, standing up and sitting down in unison), in other words elements of rituals, 
and fourthly, visual and auditory indicators of affiliation or identity (banner, emblem and 
anthem), which can be seen as symbols. Therefore, I divide my consequent analysis in 
the following way: scene, roles, symbols and rituals (sub-chapters 5.1-5.4).  
Csepeli’s last requisite, “regulated behaviour”, is not included in my analysis, since 
prohibition of behaviour, such as yawning or blowing one’s nose does not play significant 
role in Jobbik’s gatherings. Some unwritten rules do of course guide people’s behaviour 
during ceremonial moments, but these can be addressed together with rituals. According 
to Csepeli (1989, p. 40), rituals and ceremonial occasions demonstrate identity or stress 
other aspects connected to it. The requisites presented above jointly encourage the 
individual to define himself/herself as a member of the in-group. Also Ross (2007, p. 63) 
has stated that these “public expressions provoke intense in-group feelings that we 
variously call patriotism, nationalism, ethnic pride, or group loyalty, as well as out-group 
fear and anger”. Csepeli’s list has been used also by Palonen (2006) to analyse political 
gatherings in Hungary before the 2002 parliamentary elections. Without going too deep 
into Csepeli’s theorizing, I consider his requisites as a useful tool for organizing my 
analysis.        
My second analytical tool is a 2-by-2 matrix developed by Brubaker (2006), with the 
purpose of situating national commemorations based on their mood and narrative 
framing. Brubaker’s (2006) model consists of two linked oppositions. The first he names 
“manner and mood” meaning two distinct ways in which the past can be represented in 
national day gatherings. The commemorations can be either held in a sacralised mood 
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characterized by elevated tone with pathos and quasi-religious elements, where 
Durkheimian “collective effervescence”11 can be sensed, or the commemorations can be 
desacralised holidays that are characterized by entertainment, spectacle and carnival 
mood. Instead of almost religious seriousness towards the past, humour and self-critique 
can be expressed. (ibid., pp. 168-169.) The other opposition Brubaker (2006) calls 
“narrative framing”, illustrating different ways in which commemorations can be framed 
or contextualized. In the first alternative events are framed in spatially, temporally, 
socially or culturally particularising terms. In second alternative events are framed in 
universalising terms, meaning that the local events are placed into a wider context. (ibid., 
p. 169.)  
Also Ross (2007, p. 73) brings up the same division between sacred and secular, but sees 
national holidays as varying combinations of the two elements. In addition, he makes a 
distinction between public and private elements present in the events. It is probably 
impossible to find pure examples of sacralised/sacred or desacralised/secular 
commemorations, but this division can function as a useful conceptual tool for uncovering 
the mood of the national day gatherings. Originally the sacred - profane opposition was 
introduced by Durkheim (1964), but it was used to distinguish the everyday life from the 
moments when the community gathers together, not for distinguishing different types of 
commemorations. 
Analysing photos taken in the field 
Visual imagery and written explanations function fundamentally on two different levels 
that can also be called mimesis (showing) and diegesis (telling) (Spencer, 2011, p. 16). 
By using visual field notes I aim at moving towards the same visual dimension that the 
people I studied used for communicating their identity and affiliations. This “immediate 
sensual reality” that can be observed in the field does not translate easily to words. To 
force something essentially visual into a solely written form already at the data collection 
state would forcedly narrow down the multitude of possible explanations. Nevertheless, 
the use of photography is far from being unproblematic. Even if photographs can, up to 
some degree, be seen as accurate visual representations of the surrounding world, the 
apparent realism of photographs conceals possibilities of manipulation and propagandist 
uses (Spencer, 2011, p. 18). This does not in any way reduce the value that visual 
                                                 
11 The concept “effervescence” was introduced by Durkheim (1964, pp. 210-211). He uses the concept to 
describe the passionate mood characteristic for revolutions and creative epochs.  
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representations can bring to social research, but is something that needs to be paid 
attention to. Since I use only my own photos in the analysis I do not need to worry about 
someone consciously attempting to manipulate the pictures. Nevertheless, I need to be 
aware of what kind of messages my photos, that capture only short instances, convey and 
how they also distort my own memories of the events.  
What is characteristic for my visual material is that the photos contain two visual levels: 
firstly, they depict visual symbols that were present in the events and secondly, they are 
visual representations of the surroundings i.e. the immediate context in which the symbol 
appears and how it is used. These visual levels are then linked to the wider societal 
context, which brings yet another level to the analysis. Visual symbols are difficult to 
analyse since they are inherently multivocal and multivalent and therefore the meanings 
individual participants attach to them are not easy to discover (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008, 
p. 546). In my analysis I do not even aim to uncover all the private meanings, but instead 
I approach symbols and their use through their current and historical context.  
Analysing commemorative speeches 
My analysis of the speeches held during the national day gatherings, aims at including 
the verbal dimension of these events into the analysis of national day commemorations. 
Since I approach the national days theoretically from a ritualistic and performative point 
of view, I view these speech acts primarily as one dimension of the ritual, which the 
collective commemorations form. In addition, I seek to situate the speeches into their 
broader context. The meanings evoked by the speaker must be understood as part of a 
wider web of meanings.  All social acts construct the time bound reality we coexist in, 
but political speeches differ from many other acts since they are usually consciously 
prepared to promote a certain world view: a particular understanding of the prevailing 
situation. The fact that these political speeches were held during national days activate 
specific historical narratives and contexts, which can then be harnessed to serve current 
political purposes.  
To pinpoint the conscious efforts to manipulate the past for present purposes, I rely on 
the concept of presentism introduced by Olick and Robbins (1998). Presentism is seen as 
an active component of the collective memory which is being constructed. It also serves 
the construction of the “Jobbikian” nationhood, which gives the supporters opportunities 
to identify with a trans-generational imagined community, that stretches far beyond the 
actual political community of Jobbik supporters. Placing the analysis of the political 
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speeches in the framework of nationalism and nationhood makes it possible to address 
the intertwined nature of the political and national identities in Hungary.  
Presentism can serve also the political purposes of creating a new frontier against Fidesz, 
besides the clearly defined right-left divide. Past divisions and legacies can serve to 
further justify the construction of the current lines of demarcation. I analyse this process 
with the concept of “frontier” as defined by Mouffe (2005). Constructing us as opposed 
to them helps also to understand how creating enemy pictures, serve the enhancing of 
solidarity within the in-group. In addition, my speech analysis addresses the change in 
Jobbik’s rhetoric, which is apparent when comparing the language used in 2013 autumn 
and 2014 spring to the earlier speeches. Lastly, I wish to include short commentaries 
about the interaction between the audience and the speakers in my analysis as well as 
emphasise the active role of the participants, which is the overarching theme of the entire 
analysis.  
4.4 Reflexivity and ethics in ethnographic visual research  
Reflexivity is an important element of all qualitative social research, but it has been 
especially central in ethnography. Reflexivity means researcher’s awareness of oneself, 
one’s action and others reactions towards the researcher (Banks, 2007 p. 50). This can 
range from being aware of one’s own biases to an extensive autobiographical frame 
encompassing the entire research (ibid., p. 15). Reflexivity is especially central to visual 
ethnographic research. 
Although ethnographers have taken photos in the field almost as long as cameras have 
been available for such purposes, the current visual ethnographic tradition differs 
significantly from its predecessors in its critical and reflexive standpoint. Using visual 
material has brought on the surface methodological and ethical questions, to which 
reflexivity is regarded the answer (see e.g. Banks, 2007, or Pink, 2007). It seems that 
many of the problems are common to qualitative research in general, but due to their 
specific (some would argue revealing) nature, visual methods tend to raise more concerns 
than more commonly used methods. Nevertheless, it is important to be constantly vigilant 
of the possible consequences of the methodological choices one makes. 
Pink, who represents rather thorough and advanced reflexivist standpoint, sees   
subjectivity in relation to the produced ethnographic knowledge at the centre of the 
reflexive approach (Pink, 2007, p. 23). Many postmodernists have taken this view so far 
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that they regard ethnography as a wholly subjective construction, a “fiction”, but for 
example Walsh (2012, p. 248) has warned ethnographers of abandoning realism 
altogether. In my own research I wish to take a moderately reflexive and constructivist 
stand and pay particular attention to the ways in which social reality is constructed12. I 
consider reflexivity an essential part of the entire research process. Being reflexive of 
one’s own choices forms a strong ground for ethical research.  
Moreover, regarding access no special research permissions were needed since the 
observations took place in public, outdoor locations in the centre of Budapest. Most of 
the photos taken include big crowds or focus on specific symbols. No portraits were taken, 
but in case some faces of the regular participants or passers-by are recognizable they will 
be blurred, if used in the thesis. Other studies using similar material, such as Brubaker et 
al. (2008), Jenkins (2011) and Kiss et al. (2014), did not elaborate extensively on the 
ethical questions. Kiss and colleagues (2014) did, however, reflect shortly on their 
position as anonymous observers. They refer to Lofland and colleagues (2006, pp. 34-
36), who see covert research conducted in public settings rather unproblematic and state 
that serious ethical debate rise only very rarely on such situations. 
In ethnographic research, also analysis is best understood as an overarching process that 
continues throughout the whole work. Fetterman (1998, p. 92) has stated that “it begins 
from the moment a fieldworker selects a problem to study and ends with the last word in 
the report or the ethnography”. I argue that this process goes hand in hand with developing 
the theoretical framework: just like theory should guide our observations in the field, at 
its best the research material brings to the surface new theoretical considerations. Next I 
continue with my empirical analysis, a process during which I have constantly developed 
further my theory as well as reflected my own position in the field and behind the camera.  
  
                                                 
12 Here I am taking into account the critic Brubaker et al. (2008) express considering social 
constructionism, see Chapter 3.2. 
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5 Empirical analysis 
My empirical analysis is structured according to the theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter 3 and Csepeli’s list of requisites presented in Chapter 4.3. Firstly, I begin my 
analysis with two mainly descriptive chapters portraying the scenes, outlining the events 
and highlighting the roles of the various actors present during the three national day 
commemorations. Secondly, I analyse the multisensory reality of the gatherings 
emphasising the importance of the visual dimension. My analysis relies on the key 
concepts of “symbol” and “ritual” and the related theory. Thirdly, I analyse the speeches 
held by Jobbik’s leader Gábor Vona through themes such as articulating the Jobbikian 
nationhood, presentism and frontier building. Fourthly I pay special attention to the 
interaction between the audience and speakers. 
I combine a “visual ethnographic from below” -perspective on the national day 
commemorations with an analysis of the speeches held in the gatherings that present 
primarily the perspective from above. Although my focus on the symbols and rituals 
stresses the active role of the audience, I consider also the party’s role in creating this 
visual dimension. Similarly, even if the main emphasis in speeches is on the message 
conveyed by the party leader I include the audience as an active participant in the analysis. 
In actuality, both of these dimensions are largely created through the interaction between 
the party elite and the audience. Visual dimension appears more accessible for the 
audience, but this does not mean that the audience would remain passive during elite 
controlled activities such as the speeches. On the contrary, their role in creating the ritual 
of the speech, and whether it is viewed as a success or a failure, is crucial (see e.g. Giesen, 
2006). To introduce my field material, I include some examples of the three photo essays 
in the analysis. 
5.1 Describing the field (the scene)  
Next I introduce the scene and the outline of the three Jobbik’s national day gatherings I 
attended. With the following descriptions I attempt to make the field of my observations 
more tangible for the reader and depict the immediate context in which the symbols and 
rituals as well as the speeches I analyse occurred.  
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August 20, Jobbik’s family day in Budapest City Park  
The 20 August 2013 Jobbik gathering was organized in Budapest City Park (Városliget), 
which is a large public park close to the city centre. The exact location of the event was 
a smaller field surrounded by big green trees between Zichy Mihály road and Olof Palme 
promenade (see Picture 4). In one end of the field there was a stage where all the music 
performances were held. The sides of the field were filled with small tents, booths and 
stands selling different accessories, clothes, CDs and DVDs related to the subculture that 
surrounds Jobbik. Also, traditional Hungarian food and drinks such as spit cakes 
(kürtőskalács), which originate from the Hungarian-speaking Székely region in Romania, 
were on sale. On the other end of the field was a big white tent with a small stage and 
chairs for the audience. This was the place where all the discussions took place (see 
Picture 4). Behind and besides the tent were most of the children activities, such as: pony 
ride, wooden merry-go-round, face painting, bouncy castle, fishing game, archery and 
other games related to Jobbik’s world view such as the map of Greater Hungary puzzle, 
which pieces consisted of the 64 historical counties. 
 
Picture 4 The woman who is being interviewed is MEP Krisztina Morvai. She was elected from the list of 
Jobbik to the European Parliament, and is one of the most influential figures in Jobbik, although not an 
official member. Her background is rather confrontational, since before becoming a MEP she was best 
known as lawyer and a human rights activist. Morvai is wearing a white T-shirt with traditional Kalocsa 
embroidery. The blond haired woman doing the interview is from a nationalist Hungarian news channel 
HírTV. Morvai has three daughters and likes to present herself as a mother figure. On the other hand, she 
has publicly worn the Hungarian Guard uniform and presented radical statements. Some people have 
gathered around Morvai to listen the interview. The woman in the front has a crocheted shoulder bag that 
has the Árpád stripes on the other side and the Hungarian coat of arms on the other. Behind Morvai a man 
is dressed in a green uniform of the Hungarian National Guard. This is another paramilitary group that 
emerged after banning the original Hungarian Guard. Further on the left is a man wearing the black uniform 
of the New Hungarian Guard. (Photo essay August 20, 2013, 13:54, part 7/13.)    
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Due to the particular emphasis on children and family, the mood of the event was rather 
relaxed. On Brubaker’s (2006) sacralised versus desacralised scale the event can be 
located closer to the desacralised end of the continuum. The aim for many seemed to be 
to have good time with likeminded friends and attend the concert afterwards. Jobbik MPs, 
such as Dóra Dúró and Előd Novák13, were showing the way by attending the programmes 
with their kids. However, sacral elements that are usually central for the Jobbikian world 
view came to surface every now and then. For example, the speeches began with the 
common greeting “May God grant it!” (Adjon az isten!) with the audience answering: 
“Brighter future!” (Szebb jövőt!). Another such element was the moment when children 
recited the Hungarian National prayer (Magyar Hiszekegy) which is connected to the 
inter-war Horthy regime and revisionism. All in all, it can be concluded that the event 
was closer to carnivalesque mood than pathos, but with many sacralised elements.   
October 23, Jobbik mass rally in front of the Ministry of Rural Development and 
Deák tér -square  
Jobbik mass rally in 23 October was divided into two parts. The first, which was titled as 
“The gathering of the victims of the government” (Kormánykárosultak nagygyűlése) took 
place at Vértanúk square and Nádor street right behind it. The location is in the heart of 
Budapest, close to the parliament, and just behind Imre Nagy’s memorial statue, which 
was surrounded by wreaths and flowers with red, white and green ribbons. In the event 
advertisements the closeness to the Ministry of Rural Development was emphasised, as 
this “warm-up” gathering was intended as a protest against the government policies 
concerning the land laws and people suffering from the foreign currency loans. The stage 
with a podium was located at the end of Nádor street, so that the audience was mainly 
gathering along the street, although some were assembled behind the stage. 
After the first gathering was over, the participants, led by two tractors, marched to Deák 
square where the main event took place. The square is named after Ferenc Deák who was 
an important political figure of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and it is an important 
traffic junction in the centre of Budapest. The actual square is rather small but often the 
whole area is referred as Deák square. The route to the square was around 1.5 km long 
and it went along Nádor street passing the main building of the Central European 
University and then turning to József Attila street and finally around Erzsébet square to 
                                                 
13 Előd Novák resigned from his MP position in June 2016 after Gábor Vona showed his mistrust towards 
him. 
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Bajcsy-Zilinszky road. On the road a big stage with a huge screen and red, white and 
green “Flags of 56” with a hole in the middle hanging from its roof were receiving the 
procession (see Picture 5).   
 
Picture 5 In this photo I depict Jobbik’s supporters waiting for the party leader, Gábor Vona to begin his 
speech in the main event at Deák tér. The stage is behind all the Árpád and Jobbik flags in the upper right 
corner. This stage was much bigger than the earlier ones and it had professional sound and light technology 
with a huge screen on the background. What caught my eye here was of course the appearance of several 
skinheads in the audience. In general, they were, however, not this apparent. Another photo that I took just 
one minute later shows only one bald man, that could have been just a coincidence, but here with five bald 
man gathered together the feeling is already different. This photo shows well how the researcher choices 
have a big impact on what kind of general picture of the event she/he conveys. (Photo essay October 23, 
2013, 16:05, part 18/19.)  
The atmosphere of these two consequent gatherings was more politicised than during 20 
August, but the level of excitement varied significantly depending on who was on the 
podium. The party leader Gábor Vona was able to engage the audience better than the 
others. Since 23 October is essentially a commemoration of the failed revolution of 1956 
the mood was consequently more sacralised and pathos laden. This could be felt 
especially when Vona defined as Jobbik’s mission to carry forward the “Flag of 56” given 
to him 10 years earlier by Gergely Pongrátz who was a legendary veteran of the 
Hungarian Revolution.  
Also singing the Hungarian national anthem together and other music and poetry related 
performances, worked well on the emotional level. All in all, the event seemed to provoke 
a strong reaction mainly on the core supporters who were located close to the stage. They 
could be seen as the insiders, who accept uncritically the political performance of “moral 
drama” as authentic (Giesen, 2006). Talking about Durkheimian “collective 
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effervescence” would seem exaggerated in this context. As it is common for Jobbik’s 
events, also this rally’s closing programme was a concert of a band that is part of the 
Hungarian “nationalist rock” (nemzeti rock) scene. This time it was a band called 
Hungarica who presents a nationalistic world view shared by many of Jobbik’s 
supporters. It can be then concluded that the closing of the event was more about 
entertainment than sacral commemoration, although it is worth to remember that the 
lyrics of Hungarica do bring up strongly nationalist contents and cannot therefore be 
viewed as mere entertainment.      
March 15, Jobbik mass rally at the Kodály körönd and Deák tér -square  
Similarly to the 23 October event, the 15 March commemoration started with a smaller 
gathering, this time organized by Jobbik’s Budapest division at Kodály körönd square 
(technically a circus not a square) named after a famous composer Zoltán Kodály, and 
which interestingly was called Adolf Hitler square during the Second World War. Kodály 
körönd forms an intersection on the Andrássy Avenue along which the marchers later 
proceeded towards Deák square. The constantly growing crowd gathered to a park on one 
half of the circus, which was cut across by Szinyei Merse street. A small stage and a 
podium, where the speeches and music performances were held, were placed on the 
Szinyei Merse street facing the avenue. The audience consisting of couple of hundred 
Jobbik supporters was standing either on the street or on the two sections of the park.  
 
Picture 6 I took this photo in the beginning of the programme on Deák square. That’s why the crowd’s focus 
is not yet fully directed on the events on stage. People are still assembling at the square. Although the 
character of the event was very similar to the October event the atmosphere was this time gloomier due to 
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the cold, grey and windy weather, which promised rain at any moment. In this photo it looks like there are 
about the same amount of the Árpád flags, Hungarian flags and Jobbik party flags, although my overall 
estimation is that there were more party flags and Árpád flags. This would mean that the dividing national 
symbols stressing the Jobbikian nationhood were overrepresented compared to the more uniting Hungarian 
flags. (Photo essay March 15, 2014, 14:57, part 12/15.) 
The main rally at Deák square was about 1.5 km walk away from Kodály körönd. The 
parade was led by three white and three dark brown horses with riders wearing historical 
suits made in 1848 style. They were followed by a brass band that consisted of 13 
members. Behind them was the main crowd, which was led by a group of Jobbik MP 
candidates holding a big banner. This time the stage on Deák square was set on the József 
Attila street, which forms almost a direct continuation to the Andrássy Avenue (see 
Picture 6). Otherwise the setting was very similar to 23 October, only now the big main 
stage was decorated with varying historical flags. The big screens intended to help the 
audience follow the events were also back, but now located further on the street. 
The structure of the series of events organized on 15 March was also rather similar to 23 
October. However, the fact that the elections were only three weeks ahead changed the 
mood of the event somewhat. Many were dressed in white campaign jackets supporting 
some of the candidates and the upcoming elections were repeatedly referred to. In 
addition, the party leader Vona was referred as a prime minister candidate and themes 
such as campaign programme and prime minister candidates’ debate were brought up. 
Furthermore, a group of counterdemonstrators was gathered earlier on a nearby location 
with a theme “Vote against Jobbik” (Szavazz a Jobbik Ellen).  Besides the upcoming 
election the worsening weather conditions placed the event into a stark contrast with the 
Indian summer feeling of the 23 October. As to the content of the programmes, the 
historical legacy of the 1848 Revolution was emphasised, freedom and continuous fight 
for it being the overarching theme. The art performances varied from reciting poetry to 
rock songs and opera singing, but all were content-wise linked to the historical themes of 
the commemoration. The mood was therefore primarily sacralised and commemorative 
instead of celebratory and desacralised.   
5.2 Who was present (the roles)  
The people present in Jobbik’s gatherings can be divided into several categories based on 
their roles in the events. I was able to identify various roles such as: supporters (and their 
subgroups), party activists, speakers, entertainers, technical staff, security personnel, 
police, representatives of the media, passers-by, tourists, vendors of food and accessories, 
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and counterdemonstrators. These categories are clearly very broad and cannot detail all 
the individual motives people have for joining these events. Nevertheless, they are useful 
in making sense of the complex dynamics that are characteristic for political mass 
gatherings.  
The supporters 
The supporters form the broadest category and encompass various subgroups that can be 
identified in many cases based on the visual signs of identity. This is of course possible 
only if the supporter chooses to emphasise their identity and allegiances. As Brubaker 
and colleagues (2008, p. 222) correctly state: “in interactional perspective, cues are not 
simply cognitive resources that can be deciphered by observers; they are also discursive 
and interactional resources that can be deployed by actors”. As a result, signs of identity 
can be both “given” and “given off” (ibid.).  
Some of the most easily identifiable group affiliations are the memberships in various 
paramilitary groups with distinct uniforms. In the last two gatherings, the members of the 
New Hungarian Guard, which is a paramilitary group founded after the dissolution of the 
original Hungarian guard in 2009, formed the most visible and biggest group that I could 
identify. Another clearly distinguishable paramilitary group was the “Hungarian National 
Guard” (Magyar Nemzeti Gárda). In addition, symbols signalling affiliation to other 
organisation such as The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye 
Ifjúsági Mozgalom) and Betyársereg (named after the Hungarian highwaymen of the 19th 
century), were visible. Some young men seemed to sympathize with national socialist 
ideology and fit under the general category of “skinheads” with bald head, black combat 
boots, black or army style trousers and bomber jacket or a white shirt. Yet another 
dimension was formed by members of various clubs, organisations and subdivisions who 
wear the core nationalist symbols combined with their own logos. For example, members 
of a motorcycle association NÉM standing for “National hearted motorcyclists” (Nemzeti 
érzelmű motorosok) (see Picture 7). 
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Picture 7  
A group of 
motorcyclists 
carrying logos 
of the NÉM, 
were leading 
the way for 
the rest of the 
procession.  
A man with 
“56’flag” was 
showing with 
a flag wave 
when the 
motorcyclists 
could leave. 
 
Nevertheless, the most typical male outfit seemed to be a pair of jeans or army trousers, 
dark T-shirt or a jacket and a black cap. The T-shirts and caps were commonly decorated 
with logos referring the various bands in the nationalist rock scene, with the map of 
Greater Hungary or alternatively with the Hungarian coat of arms and in some occasions 
with Székely land and conquest of the Carpathian Basin related themes. 
 
Picture 8 Jobbik 
supporters marching 
on 23 October 
 
Another distinct element in the clothing of Jobbik supporters, were the frequently present 
folk dresses and various different kind of traditional accessories such as traditional leather 
bags (tarsoly) or fur hats with a design that can be traced back to the time of the conquest 
of the Carpathian Basin. Perhaps the most frequently appearing traditional dress was the 
so called Bocskai dress (bocskai viselet), which has a frogged jacket with a beautiful 
ornamental braiding as its most prominent feature. These jackets could be found mainly 
on men. Among the women the most common traditional element in clothing was the 
Hungarian flower embroidery from Kalocsa (kalocsai hímzés) that can be found on 
various clothes and accessories, but it is most common on shirts. I could also spot some 
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women and girls wearing folk costumes (see e.g. Picture 21). In addition to the visual 
signs of identity described above, a large number of people wore clothes or accessories 
in Hungarian national colours of red, white and green and with the red and white Árpád 
stripes (Picture 8). These symbolic elements are analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.3. 
Although many were signalling their identity and group affiliations through visual means, 
not all the supporters did that. The presence of regularly dressed supporters is easily 
overshadowed by the eye-catching accessories and clothes. For example, during 20 
August family day majority of the people were wearing regular summer clothes. Not all 
chose to emphasise their identity in the two later gatherings either, for example on 15 
March many chose to simply wear the commonly used Hungarian cockade.  
All in all, it can be said that a clear majority of the supporters were men (although during 
20 August there were many families present). Perhaps the most typical supporters were 
groups of young men occasionally accompanied by their girlfriends. Also middle-aged 
men, often in small groups, were a common sight. Several studies (e.g. Kovács, 2013; 
Grajczjár & Tóth, 2011; Rudas, 2010) have shown that young men are clearly 
overrepresented among Jobbik voters. Nevertheless, based on my overall estimate of the 
participants, it cannot be said that Jobbik’s gatherings attract only young men. Even if 
they were overrepresented, Jobbik had succeeded in mobilizing both men and women of 
all ages.      
Other groups present 
Besides the supporters, which form by far the biggest and most diverse group, I could 
identify many other actors who play an important role in the gatherings. Clearly the events 
would be nothing without the speakers and entertainers such as musicians and actors who 
were responsible of the programmes on the stage. Some party activists and volunteers 
carried out tasks such as filling and handing the balloons, whereas others were ensuring 
the security of the events and processions in yellow vests. Police were present in all the 
gatherings, but most visible during the 23 October march towards Deák square. Some 
representatives of the media were making interviews during 20 August family day, but 
their role was more notable during the mass rallies. Since I was taking photos myself, I 
paid special attention to the cameramen and photographers. It was clear that the 
processions formed key moments of visual drama for them. Earlier the cameramen and 
photographers had been leisurely circulating the event areas, but starting of the 
processions put all of them on high alert.  
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Media’s role in the gatherings is important to include in the analysis since they broadcast 
the events to the wider audience and therefore play a key role in creating the public image 
of Jobbik. It is obvious that Jobbik’s party elite is conscious about the presence of the 
media and it was occasionally referred to or even made fun of. On the other hand, creating 
an attractive media image is of great significance for Jobbik since it aims at transforming 
itself to a people’s party (néppárt) with a broad voter base. Therefore, it can be asked, to 
whom for example the processions are performed? They surely function as a uniting rite 
for all the participants, but offer simultaneously dramatic visual material for the press. I 
noticed that sometimes it was hard to resist taking photos of these visually captivating 
performances and turn the lens towards less dramatic although equally significant 
instances.  
Lastly, it is worth mentioning the presence of vendors who were selling various Jobbik 
subculture related accessories and Hungarian foods and drinks. Especially during 20 
August they played a big role in creating the mood and underlining the Hungarianness of 
the event. Some vendors were present also during the last two mass rallies of 23 October 
and 15 March, but not in the same numbers. These last two events did, however, attract 
the attention of numerous tourists. They were taking photos and filming the processions, 
especially the marching of the New Hungarian Guard, probably completely unaware of 
its infamous reputation. During the last and most politicized mass rally on 15 March, the 
nearness of counterdemonstrators was a theme that was commented on. Nevertheless, the 
presence of “the other” remained on an abstract level since the two groups never met.  
5.3 Symbols in Jobbik’s gatherings 
Symbols, especially visual symbols are probably the first thing an observer notices in 
Jobbik’s national day gatherings. They are everywhere and they are more democratic than 
the speaker’s podium that gives voice for only a selected few. Symbols are condensed 
with meanings (see Turner, 1967) and allow the audience and the party a possibility to 
communicate these meanings through non-verbal means. Although it is impossible to 
grasp all the individual meanings attached to these symbolic vessels, the messages are 
being send and received: “I’m a true Hungarian”, “You are one of us”, “The historical 
borders of Hungary should be returned”, “Székely land should receive autonomy” or “I 
know my history and roots”. These and many other messages seem to be filling the air 
when the flags are raised and uniforms are worn. Symbols, such as flags, are objects that 
can be used for expressing attitudes and sentiments (see Firth, 1973, p.77). They 
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communicate meanings with the help of colours and designs as well as with their active 
use (Elgenius, 2011, p. 59). The above sentences are my attempts to put into a written and 
visual form this non-verbal communication.  
My understanding of the role of symbolic messages is in line with Elgenius (2011, p.2), 
who sees studying symbols and rituals as a way of gaining new insights into processes of 
self-reference, differentiation and struggle for affirmation. For example, a flag can 
simultaneously convey a message of the carrier’s identity, make a differentiation between 
“us” and “them” and express the claims for autonomy and political recognition. The flag 
of Székely land (Picture 10) is an illustrative example of a symbol, which use is connected 
to all the three processes described by Elgenius.    
The power of a symbol is connected to the weight of the meanings that it condenses as a 
result of years and years of ritual usage (Jenkins, 2011; Turner, 1967). Therefore, it is 
important to understand also the historical developments, through which certain symbols 
have gained their power. Symbols can also be used to express solidarities and they give a 
tangible form for expressing the particular nationalist ideology (see Breuilly, 1994). What 
is noteworthy for the symbolic communication in Jobbik’s gatherings, are the creative 
combinations of symbols. This mixing and tuning seems to further demonstrate the 
knowledge and understanding of the person who carries the symbols. There are, however, 
some basic symbolic elements that most of these “fusion-symbols” consist of. Usually 
they draw their power from the core Hungarian national and political symbols, which I 
introduce first. 
I have developed a typology, which I use for dividing the symbols present in Jobbik’s 
gatherings into three different categories based on their uniting and dividing nature. 
Firstly, there are the common Hungarian national symbols that communicate wider 
national solidarity. These are for example the national flag, the national coat of arms, the 
national anthem and to some extent the Hungarian cockade, which has been also used to 
mark the difference between the right-wing and the left-wing supporters (see e.g. Palonen, 
2006), but has recently been visible also in the left-wing gatherings. 
Secondly, there are the national symbols that are either exclusively used by Jobbik or 
monopolised by Jobbik to such extent that other parties usually avoid their use (see 
Eriksen, 2007). These symbols are nationalistic, but can be recognized as 
characteristically presenting Jobbik’s nationalism, and can therefore be seen divisive and 
exclusive. These are for example the Árpád flag, the pre-Trianon coat of arms of the 
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Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen and to some extent several mythological elements 
such as the Turul bird and the riding Árpád figure. 
Thirdly, there are Jobbik’s party symbols that are primarily showing attachment to Jobbik 
as a political party. Some of the most common are Jobbik’s party flag and logo and 
Jobbik’s youth division’s flag and logo. These are clearly political party symbols, but 
what blurs the line between the nation and the party is that all the party symbols contain 
the national colours of red, white and green just like the national symbols. Already this 
choice of colours is a clear signal: “Jobbik is a true Hungarian nationalist party”. The 
party leadership does not even attempt to build an alternative visual imagery that would 
refer to Jobbik only, but instead draws symbolic power from the national colours. 
Next I introduce in more detail the key visual symbols mentioned it the typology above. 
There is no clear-cut division between symbols and rituals, which are by nature symbolic 
actions (see Kertzer, 1988). However, for practical reasons I have chosen to introduce 
slogans together with their ritual usage in Chapter 5.4, whereas the vast dimension of 
visual symbols is first introduced here and their ritual usage, such as flag ceremonies and 
marching, only later together with other rituals. The following sub-chapters are largely 
based on the picture analyses and the consequent three photo essays, that I wrote of the 
47 photos and 7 film stills. I include in the analysis examples of the photo essays in order 
to illustrate my research process. In addition, the photo essays add another reflective layer 
to my thesis.  
Core symbols present in Jobbik’s gatherings 
The Árpád stripes 
The most common national symbol in those Jobbik’s gatherings I attended to, were the 
Árpád stripes. These eight red and white stripes form an old symbol used originally in the 
flag of the Árpád dynasty that ruled Hungary from the 9th till the 13th century. The Árpád 
dynasty is named after the leader of the Hungarian tribes who lived in the 9th century and 
is thought to have led the Hungarians to the Carpathian Basin around the years 895-896 
(Takalo, 2004). Before and during the World War II Árpád stripes, but with one more red 
stripe than Jobbik uses, appeared in the flag of the Hungarian national socialist Arrow 
Cross Party. In the past ten years the use of the Árpád stripes has been a heated topic in 
Hungarian politics and some have suggested that they should be banned (Index, 
2.11.2006).  
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Today the Árpád stripes are used excessively by the radical right and can be seen 
everywhere in Jobbik and the New Hungarian Guard gatherings in flags, coat of arms, 
maps, scarfs, clothes and all kinds of accessories. The Árpád stripes can be seen as 
symbolising Árpád’s lands i.e. the Greater Hungary and the unity of ethnic Hungarians 
in the Carpathian Basin, but simultaneously it is rejected by many Hungarians and 
therefore, as a symbol it is both uniting and dividing (see Elgenius, 2011, p. 57). Since a 
state flag is perhaps the single most significant national symbol, there is an inherent 
tension caused by the use of an alternative flag. Even if the Árpád stripes are included to 
the coat of arms of Hungary, in the form of a flag they appear to be contesting the official 
state nationalism and the Hungarian tricolour (see Picture 9), which is closely linked to 
the European republic tradition. Since in the current situation the Árpád stripes are 
primarily associated with Jobbik, they are destined to be divisive. I argue that, as symbols, 
the Árpád stripes are not empty enough to promote wider solidarity (cf. Eriksen, 2007). 
Jobbik’s monopolizing usage of this symbol further emphasizes the symbol’s divisive 
character. 
The flag of Hungary 
Another very common symbol in the gatherings was the Hungarian tricolour with 
horizontal red, white and green stripe. The flag of Hungary and all the items decorated 
with red, white and green: ribbons, scarfs and cockades, to name a few, were almost as 
frequent as the Árpád stripes. The flag of Hungary originates from the March 1848 
Revolution and is inspired by the French tricolour, but the used colours have a much 
longer history. The red and white colours go back to the Árpád dynasty, whereas the green 
started to appear among them during the 17th century. (Bertényi, 2000.) During the post-
World War II socialist era the official flag included the Rákosi coat of arms. This socialist 
symbol consisted of red star, hammer and an ear of wheat. During the October 1956 
revolution the coat of arms was cut off the flag as a protest against the Soviet control. 
(Dömötörfi, 2003.) The Hungarian flag with a hole in the middle symbolizes this act and 
could be spotted in Jobbik’s 23 October national day commemoration. The modifications 
of flags make visible their political character and their connection to nation building (see 
Elgenius, 2011, p. 61). 
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Picture 9 Huge flag of Hungary and Árpád flag 
 
Picture 10 Flag of the Székely land and a smaller 
Árpád and Polish flag 
 
The flag of Székely land 
In addition to the frequent Árpád stripes and the Hungarian tricolour, the flag of the 
Székely land, was occasionally visible in the gatherings. Besides flags, the design could 
be seen for example in head bands and scarfs. This newly invented flag represents a region 
in Romania, with many ethnic Hungarians, that wishes to gain autonomy. The flag has a 
light blue background, one golden line in the middle and a golden star/sun and a silver 
moon. The currently used form of the Székely flag is from 2004, when it was designed 
by art historian, Ádám Kónya for the Szekler National Council. Although the flag itself 
is new, it consists of old elements. The sun and the moon are traditional Székely symbols 
that can be traced back till the Middle Ages and also the blue background with a stripe in 
the middle can be found in old flags of the region. (Takács, 2013.) 
The strong symbolism connected to Székely land, Transylvania and Greater Hungary as 
well as traditional elements in the participants dressing, such as the red, black and white 
Székely style dress of the girl in Picture 21, all express nostalgic and idealized connection 
with the lost territories (see also Kovács, 2016). Besides nostalgia, these symbols can 
express demands for Székely autonomy and better minority rights for Hungarians living 
outside the current state borders. Outside the nationalistic framework, this grave concern 
for the Hungarian ethnic minorities situation appears inconsistent with the negative 
attitudes expressed towards the minorities living in Hungary. 
The three flags introduced above are all connected to different nationalistic projects. The 
official flag of Hungary represents the current Hungarian state, whereas the Árpád stripes 
are often linked to the historical Hungarian state and revisionist thinking. Székely flag, 
on the other hand, can be seen also outside the scope of revisionism, as symbolizing the 
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need for recognition of a minority culture and language and as a quest for autonomy. 
When it comes to the origins of these flags, they date back to different eras and flag 
traditions: Árpád flag is part of the pre-modern monarchical imagery, the Hungarian 
tricolour originates from modern age and the republican movement, whereas the newly 
invented Székely flag can be placed to the more recent flag tradition that, nevertheless, 
draws its inspiration from the ancient past (see Elgenius, 2011). 
The flag of Jobbik 
The forth prominent symbol in the events is the flag of Jobbik. It consists of the party 
logo, which is formed by a white cross with two bars and three circular forms with colours 
green, white and red. The logo is told to present a stylised sailing boat whose mast is 
represented by the cross, whereas the circular forms represent the sails. According to the 
explanation on Jobbik home page, the mast symbolises the foundation of the communities 
and the wind of the history is blowing to the sails and moving the nation forward towards 
its future. (Jobbik, 2016.)  The white cross refers clearly also to the Hungarian coat of 
arms that includes a similar cross. The green and red triangles on the sides of the white 
background of the flag are called “wolf-teeth decoration” (farkasfog díszítés) and have a 
long history in Hungarian army flags. Usually these flags have also the name of the 
faction of its carrier (Picture 1).  
Another very similar flag, but with red and green background, is the flag of Jobbik Youth 
Division (Jobbik ifjúsági tagozat). This flag has also a white cross in the middle, but it 
has only one bar and next to the cross stands a white letter-i. The cross can be also seen 
as representing a letter-t and together with the letter-i they form the abbreviation for 
“ifjúsági tagozat” IT (Picture 11). It is noteworthy that both of these flags contain 
Hungarian national colours the red, white and green and a Christian cross symbol. This 
symbolism emphasises Jobbik’s nationalist, Christian and conservative ideology, but 
does not build a distinct party identity beyond nationalist framework. Also Kapitány and 
Kapitány (1998) have identified these symbolic elements central to Hungarian 
conservative parties’ imagery.    
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Picture 11 Members of Jobbik 
Youth Division (Jobbik ifjúsági 
tagozat) are holding the division’s 
flags and a banner that says 
“Time separates, but the 
patriotism connects us!” (Az idő 
elválaszt, de a hazaszeretet 
összeköt!) 
 
The Hungarian cockade and its variations 
Hungarian cockade is an important national symbol that is based on the Hungarian 
tricolour, but due to its distinct history, it deserves its own section. The Hungarian 
cockade (kokárda) is the most significant March 15 related national symbol and during 
the socialism it was a symbol of resistance (Kapitány & Kapitány, 1999, p. 9). It is made 
of a ribbon with Hungarian national colours and the circular shape on the top has usually 
green in the middle followed by white and finally red on the outer side. During the March 
15 Jobbik gathering I was also able to spot Hungarian cockades with the colours in reverse 
order. Some of Jobbik’s supporters claim this to be the correct or authentic version of the 
Hungarian cockade (Jobbik, 2014a). Wearing the cockade’s colours in reverse order can 
be interpreted as a clear attempt to distinct oneself from the more common usage of the 
symbol. The huge size of the reversed cockades only emphasises this distinction. During 
15 March gathering one older lady had gone even further and wore a cockade with 
reversed colours attached to Árpád striped red and white ribbons. 
The coats of arms of Hungary 
In addition to the flag symbolism, which was rather dominant in Jobbik mass gatherings, 
I introduce the two variants of the coat of arms of Hungary that were present in the events. 
The currently used official coat of arms consists of the Árpád stripes on the dexter (the 
viewer’s left), and a silver Patriarchal cross on the hills on the sinister (the viewer’s right). 
On the top, there is the Holy Crown of Hungary, which is one of the most significant 
symbols of the Hungarian state on its own right (see e.g. Nyyssönen, 2001). The current 
coat of arms was reinstated after the end of socialism in 1990 after a political debate. The 
other suggested alternative, which was by its supporters thought to present a more 
democratic tradition, was the “Kossuth emblem”, practically the same coat of arm, but 
without the crown. (Nyyssönen, 2008, p. 173.)  
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The use of coat of arms in Jobbik’s gatherings is not limited to the current coat of arms 
of Hungary. A careful look reveals that many of the coat of arms present in Jobbik’s 
gatherings are the ones that were used in Hungary before the treaty of Trianon. This coat 
of arms consists of several regional coats of arms (Dalmatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Fiume, 
Transylvania, and Croatia) with Hungarian coat of arms in the centre and two angels 
holding it from the sides. This so called “medium coat of arms” (középcímer) or the “coat 
of arms of the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen” was used with some modifications 
from the mid-19th century until 1918, but the version that was used in Jobbik’s gatherings 
is from year 1915. The treaty of Trianon in 1920 and the territorial losses led to decades 
of disputes resulting finally in reintroduction of the “medium coat of arms” besides the 
“small coat of arms” in 1938. It was used until the Nazi occupation in the end of World 
War II. (Bertényi, 1983.) In Jobbik’s gatherings these coats of arms are seen in flags as 
well as in clothes, such as vests and caps. In addition, they appear regularly in the Greater 
Hungary stickers (Picture 12 and Picture 13) in Jobbik supporters and other national 
minded people’s car bumpers and back windows14. The use of the stickers has raised 
heated debates concerning the messages these kinds of symbols convey to the 
neighbouring countries (see Feischmidt, 2014).  
 
Picture 12 Car stickers with the map of Greater Hungary 
and the two versions of the Coat of arms of Hungary. The 
red and white colours are connected to the idea of Greater 
Hungary, whereas the tricolour presents the current state. 
 
Picture 13 "Hungarian child in the car!" 
(Magyar gyerek a kocsiban!) states the sticker 
on the top, which depicts a child practicing 
traditional Hungarian archery on a horse 
back. Below a Jobbik party logo with letter H.  
  
The map of Greater Hungary 
The Map of Greater Hungary (Nagy-Magyarország), showing the borders before the 
Trianon peace treaty made in 1920, is a revisionist national symbol, that was used 
commonly during the inter-war years (see e.g. Zeidler, 2002). This symbol has been 
                                                 
14 I did not take Pictures 13 and 14 at the Jobbik gatherings. The car with the stickers was parked on the 
side of a street in Budapest XVI district and could be identified as Jobbik supporter’s car based on the 
symbols. In addition to Jobbik logo (Picture 14), it had a sticker on the windshield with a text “Jobbik, 
The Movement for Better Hungary” (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom).    
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reinvented in the past ten, fifteen years by Jobbik and other related radical right 
organizations (see Feischmidt, 2014). Despite of the overwhelming visual presence of the 
map of Greater Hungary in the national day gatherings, Jobbik does not officially have 
revisionist political ambitions. Nonetheless, the situation of the ethnic Hungarians living 
in the neighbouring countries is very central for Jobbik’s policies.  In their 2010 Election 
Manifesto Jobbik states that “our political horizons are not defined by the borders of our 
country, but by the borders of our nation” (Jobbik, 2010b, p. 15). The party emphasises 
that they do not think in terms of 10 million Hungarian citizen, but 15 million ethnic 
Hungarians (ibid., p.15). The 2014 Election Programme expresses the same line of 
thinking with words “we are from the same blood” and declares that the party feels 
responsible for every Hungarian (Jobbik, 2014b, p. 77).  
During the national day gatherings, I soon noticed that no matter what was the occasion, 
symbolism connected to the Greater Hungary seemed to be a reoccurring theme. None of 
the events that I attended were particularly related to Trianon, Transylvania or Székely 
land, and therefore this content appears as something that is actively initiated also “from 
below” by the participants. Although it must be added, that for example the huge Székely 
flag, which is flown besides the Hungarian flag in the front line of the marches (Picture 
10) is clearly initiated by the party leadership. Based on my observations the revival of 
the inter-war revisionist symbols in Jobbik gatherings goes hand in hand with anti-
Semitism and prejudices against ethnic minorities (cf. Kovács, 2016). It appears that 
restoring old symbols also revive the connected worldviews and therefore revisionist 
symbolism cannot be seen only as a “toolbox” as Feischmidt (2014, p. 57) seems to 
suggest. I agree with Feischmidt (2014) that the reasons for the re-emergence of these 
symbols have to be searched from the present context, but her approach de-emphasises 
the process, through which certain ideological “package” is condensed into these symbols 
during their use in the past.  
Mythical symbols 
The mythical Turul bird (see Picture 15) can be seen as a national totem animal for 
Hungarians. According to a legend, it was said to impregnate Emese, the Hungarian 
foremother, who then gave birth to Álmos who was Árpád’s father. The symbols first 
confirmed appearance was in the Transylvanian warrior group’s flag in 1321. It became 
again more popular in the end of the 19th century as part of the rise of nationalism and 
interest towards the myth of origin. After the Treaty of Trianon Turul bird become almost 
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inseparable element of Trianon memorials and thereafter it has been closely linked to the 
radical right ideology. (Ungváry, 2005.) In Jobbik’s gatherings I could identify two 
different forms of Turul. Firstly, there was the so called Rakamazi Turul symbol, which 
is an old symbol found in jewelleries from Rakamaz town. This symbol was often 
combined with the Árpád stripes. Secondly there were more stylised versions of a spread 
winged Turul reminding an eagle carrying a sword. This symbol combined with the Map 
of Greater Hungary seems clearly a battle symbol.  
Turul bird and the Hungarian myth of origin are closely linked to the historical Árpád 
dynasty, which is sometimes even called “the Turul dynasty”. Árpád, despite of being a 
historical figure, is also a mythical national symbol surrounded by legends. In the 
gatherings Árpád is often presented on a horse back and carrying the red and white flag 
of the dynasty (see Picture 14). Sometimes the riding figures, appearing mainly on T-
shirts, are more anonymous, representing an unidentifiable mythical warrior from the era 
of conquest of Hungary. 
 
Picture 14 Árpád riding a horse 
 
Picture 15 Turul bird carrying a sword 
Jobbik’s active subculture – self-made and purchased symbols  
When I first arrived to the field, it took me some time to understand the multitude of the 
symbols present in Jobbik’s gatherings. For example, at first sight, two flags might seem 
the same, but in addition to regular Jobbik, Árpád and Hungarian flags there were 
numerous variations. Árpád flag with added nine lions refers to the Hungarian Guard15, 
and Árpád coat of arms is also used as a guard symbol. Sometimes the flag of Hungary is 
                                                 
15 The coat of arms with lions was originally used by king Emeric (Imre király) in the beginning of the 
13th century (Bertényi, 1983). 
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flown in its basic form, but often with additional symbols, such as coats of arms. In 
addition, there are the flags and the T-shirts with the map of Greater Hungary. These maps 
can have various nationalist decorations or the map can be broken to pieces to illustrate 
the loss of the territories after the Treaty of Trianon with words “Trianon 1920 June 4. 
No, no, never!” (Trianon 1920. június 4. Nem, nem, soha!). In some occasions, the 
supporters seemed to directly insult Romanians by wearing a Romanian map without the 
territory of Transylvania accompanied by a text “Romania, I love you like this!” 
(Románia, én így szeretlek!).  
The diversity and nuances of the symbolic world that is being created is largely due to 
Jobbik’s active supporters, who clearly put a lot of effort on their appearance. The level 
of commitment varies from person to person, but it is apparent that for many these 
gatherings, and all the clothes and accessories they bring along them, are very important. 
They form a distinct subculture. These symbols are not just given from above but the 
supporters use them actively and creatively to convey different kinds of messages. Old 
and new visual symbols, as well as verbal symbols, are used to send messages to others 
who are present and know how to read them.  
Understanding the visual communication filling these symbolic arenas requires lot of 
knowledge of Jobbik’s subculture and sometimes the meaning of a certain symbol became 
clear to me only after searching it extensively from the internet and some remain unclear 
and probably unnoticed even till today. Nevertheless, it can be said that many of Jobbik 
supporters are consciously putting emphasis on communicating their Hungarianness. 
Since that is anyway assumed in Hungary, one can ask are they actually communicating 
their Jobbik identity, some kind of truer and better Hungarian identity, or alternatively 
their connections to Transylvania or other lost territories. Brubaker and his colleagues 
(2008) stress that, in addition to just emphasising or downplaying one’s membership, one 
can also make an already known category membership relevant in a certain context. This 
membership can be used for example to justify certain opinions or actions, to claim 
“insider” or membership status, or to control the borders of a certain category. (ibid., pp. 
224-225.)  
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Picture 16 This photo shows some of the accessories that were on sale during the event. These were for 
example: T-shirts with logos, various kinds of flags, caps with Árpád stripes, trousers, books with 
nationalistic content, scarves with the Hungarian coat of arms and even a pinwheel spinner in Hungarian 
colours and a coat of arms in the middle. Many of the visitors seem to already have lot of accessories and 
clothes to fit in. In this photo there are two men, who are wearing T-shirts of an association called “Nemzeti 
érzelmű motorosok” (National hearted motorcyclists). The white T-shirts have a map of Great Hungary 
with Árpád stripes and logo which forms a motorcycle and also the abbreviation NÉM. The association has 
a homepage, but all the content is not freely available for guest visitors. They for example arrange an event 
called “Adj gázt!” (Give gas!) which double-edged anti-Semitic meaning is easy to grasp. The girl looking 
the flags on sale has text on the back of her shirt written with old Hungarian alphabet called “székely 
rovásírás”. This alphabet is used regularly in nationalist minded posters and logos. The man with a yellow 
sleeveless shirt has a waist bag with a Hungarian coat of arms hanging over his shoulder. (Photo essay 
August 20, 2013, 13:56, part 9/13.) 
The subculture formed by Jobbik supporters is tightly linked to distinct consumption 
choices and it is capable of maintaining a separate network of shops and services, which 
profile their products as “national” (nemzeti) by their character (see Jeskó et al., 2012). 
Picture 16 shows well how the market economy and consumption has penetrated the 
sphere of radical right nationalism and is clearly visible also in the national day 
gatherings. This commercial production of symbols for nationalistically aware consumers 
seems to play a central role in involving the supporters to the Jobbikian nationalist project. 
The accessories that were on sale during the gatherings included flags and T-shirts 
decorated with various combination of nationalistic elements introduced as well as 
products made of leather such as belts and bracelets. In addition, nationalist rock music 
and related products such as CDs and DVDs were on sale. Jobbik, together with the sellers 
of nationalist products, as well as nationalist rock and folk-rock bands, seem to all benefit 
from this alliance. By bringing the popular nationalist rock bands to perform in their 
events, Jobbik can mobilize potential supporters, who would otherwise not be interested 
in listening to political speeches, whereas the bands and sellers are provided various 
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occasions to present their music or sell their products. Another example of how political 
preferences can lead to divisions in the level of consumption is the taxi company 
“National taxi” (Nemzeti taxi), which is directing its services specifically for national 
minded customers. In the logo of the company there is a white map of Greater Hungary 
on a red and green background and in the middle of the map the coat of arms of the Lands 
of the Crown of Saint Stephen held by angels (see Picture 17).   
 
Picture 17 
“National taxi” 
(Nemzeti taxi) 
 
The devotion of some of the supporters and the time invested for the visual self-
expression is best shown in the self-made visual symbols that can be seen during the 
events. These varied from using tricolour and Árpád stripe ribbons as head bands and 
decorations to a self-made shoulder bag that formed the coat of arms of Hungary (Picture 
4). Perhaps the most impressive self-made symbol was a flag carried by an older man in 
the 15 March event. This carefully made flag formed a complex and a unique national 
symbol which combined both the Hungarian and the Árpád flag together with the Map of 
Greater Hungary and a written revisionist demand to take back the lost territories (Picture 
18).  
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Picture 18 The flag held by an older man caught my attention immediately. It was very carefully made, 
actually consisting of two flags: the Árpád flag and the Hungarian flag. In the middle of the flag is drawn 
the map of the Greater Hungary with lot of small text that I could recognize as the names of the 64 historical 
pre-Trianon Hungarian counties. Some kind of triangles, like sun rays, are drawn above the map. The main 
text states: “It is the holy right and duty of every Hungarian to take back the stolen ancient Carpathian 
home”, (Minden magyar szent joga, kötelessége visszavenni az elrabolt ősi Kárpáti hont). On the sides of 
the flag is written mani–keizmus and bud–hizmus that refer to two old religions. All the four sides of the 
flag are decorated with red and green wolf-teeth pattern. The other half of the flag was also fully decorated 
with small symbols and writings. On the right there is a man and a woman holding white Jobbik balloons 
and dressed for the occasion, wearing red, white and green. The man has a Hungarian flag on his shoulders 
and a Hungary themed scarf around his neck. On the left one of the two women is wearing the Hungarian 
cockade (kokárda) which is the most significant March 15 related national symbol. (Photo essay March 15, 
2014, 13:49, part 4/15.) 
The commercialisation of nationalist symbols demonstrates well that the sacredness or 
banalness of a particular symbol depends on the context in which it is used (see e.g. Billig, 
1995; Elgenius, 2011). The sacred nature of a symbol, such as national flag, is obtained 
through its ritual treatment. Also seemingly mundane symbols, such as T-shirts with 
nationalist content, can become part of the sacred when they are worn in ceremonies, 
which are considered sacred by their nature. Jobbik’s gatherings are meeting places of the 
banal and sacred (cf. Billig, 1995; Skey, 2006; Giesen, 2006). Commercial symbol 
production and consumerism coexists with sacred contents of national commemorations. 
The new uses of flags by political parties and various organisations can be seen as an 
example of the flexibility of symbols. Despite their use in various contexts, flags have 
maintained their character as “compact and manageable symbols of expressing new 
notion of nationhood by endorsements or protests” (Elgenius, 2011, p. 81).      
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5.4 Ritual elements in Jobbik’s gatherings  
The eye-catching visual symbols discussed above, cover only one dimension of the rich 
multisensory reality that I and the others in the audience encountered. Besides being 
shown and seen, symbols are written, spoken and sang. I now move, after first introducing 
the written slogans, from the contents of symbols towards their active usage in rituals. 
This gradual shift from symbols to symbolic action and rituals is primarily a shift in my 
focus, since symbol’s meanings are created through ritual enactment and therefore cannot 
be understood separately (see e.g. Kertzer, 1988, Jenkins, 2011).  
Written and verbal symbols consist of specific words, which have more commonly agreed 
(although not entirely unambiguous) meanings, than visual symbols. Words, just like 
flags and coats of arms can be filled with symbolic weight through their ritualist usage 
(cf. Jenkins, 2011). In Jobbik’s gatherings I was able to specify some key types of written 
and verbal symbols, such as slogans, anthems, chants and oaths. Next I focus on these 
symbols as well as their usage and then cover the other key ritual elements such as 
marching, balloon release and flag ceremony. 
The use of national and political symbols in their social context 
Written slogans 
In the Jobbik national day gatherings the central stages and front lines of the processions 
were marked with written slogans as well as with visual symbols. Practically all stages 
had a banner with a slogan and also the front of the podium often had a slogan written on 
it. A banner that was used both in August and in October (Picture 19) had a slogan “Shall 
we be members, or free?” (Tagok legyünk, vagy szabadok?), which refers to Hungarian 
poet Petőfi’s (1823-1849) original text “Shall we be slaves or free?” (Rabok legyünk, vagy 
szabadok?) from his famous poem called “National song” (Huotari, 2004, pp. 143, 147). 
The upper half of the banner shows the flag of Europe referring to the union membership, 
whereas the lower half is covered by the flag of Hungary presenting the second option: 
the freedom. The main stage in August had also a big banner with a slogan (Picture 20), 
which is actually a direct quotation from another Hungarian poet Sajó Sándor (1868-
1933) who was born in Ipolyság that is currently part of Slovakia and who actively spoke 
for regaining the territories lost in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 (Hungarian biography 
lexicon, 2016). The quote “Get away robbers, –this is my home” (El innen a rablók, - ez 
az én hazám) refers clearly to the lost territories in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia, but in 
the present context it can be understood also as a message to different groups who Jobbik 
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considers as “robbers”, such as representatives of multinational corporations, the EU and 
political opponents. These two examples demonstrate well how a relatively young party 
is capable of harnessing the nationalist symbolic potential of historical figures. Slogans 
filled with historical meanings are yet another example of how politics is communicated 
through symbolism (see Kertzer, 1988).   
 
Picture 19 “Shall we be members, or free?” (Tagok 
legyünk, vagy szabadok?) 
 
Picture 20  “Get away robbers. –this is my home” (El 
innen a rablók, - ez az én hazám) 
 
The slogan on the podium during the October 23 event was “Only the nation!” (Csak a 
nemzet) and in March 15 “We say it out loud. We solve it.” (Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk.). 
These short slogans are clearly meant to be an extension of the words of the party leaders 
and aim at profiling Jobbik as a nationalist minded and capable political party. Slogans 
were also carried by the party activists. During the 15 March event a big banner with the 
opening words of Petőfi’s National song, “On your feet, Hungarian!” (Talpra, magyar!), 
was first held in front of the stage and then carried by the MP candidates during the 
procession. In the main event members of the Jobbik Youth Division (Jobbik ifjúsági 
tagozat) were holding a banner (Picture 11) stating: “Time separates, but the patriotism 
connects us.” (Az idő elválaszt, de a hazaszeretet összeköt!). Besides these well-made 
party banners, the regular supporters did not in general use signs or banners to express 
themselves; instead the emphasis was on clothes, accessories and flags that occasionally 
contained also written messages. The only exceptions were the couple of signs 
commenting on the role of the banks and the government in misleading the people to take 
foreign currency loans and signs expressing their support for Jobbik in 23 October 
gathering.   
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Greeting the leader and chanting 
In Jobbik’s gatherings a central ritual element is the greeting “May God grant it! Brighter 
future! (Adjon az Isten! Szebb jövőt!). The first half of the greeting “May God grant it!” 
is usually shouted by someone from the party leadership, to which the audience replies 
“Brighter future!”. The popularity of the speaker can be estimated by the enthusiasm of 
the audience, and clearly the party leader Gábor Vona receives by far the loudest 
response. Similar greetings were in use during the inter-war years, and the “Brighter 
future!” -greeting originates from a paramilitary Levente movement (Ilyés, 2014, p.334). 
The second half of the greeting “May God grant it!” was used more commonly and it was, 
for example, part of an irredentist greeting developed by a catholic priest Zoltán Várady 
(Zeidler, 2002, p. 77). Besides this central Jobbikian greeting, common chant during the 
marches was “Ria, ria, Hungária”, which is used by supporters of Hungarian football 
players and other athletes. Some of the speakers, particularly Vona, were welcomed by 
people chanting words “Isten hozott, Isten hozott!” (Welcome, welcome!), which means 
literally “God brought you”.   
The Hungarian Credo 
The “Hungarian Credo” (Magyar Hiszekegy) is the most known revisionist poem in 
Hungary. It won a patriotic poetry competition in 1920 and was recited in schools both in 
the beginning and end of the school day during the inter-war years (Zeidler, 2002, pp. 80-
81). Jobbik has initiated in 2010 the reintroduction of “the Hungarian Credo” into 
Hungarian schools (Alfahír, 26.7.2010). During the 20 August family day programme, 
children recited this poem, which text is the following: “I believe in one God, I believe in 
one Homeland, I believe in one divine eternal justice, I believe in the resurrection of 
Hungary. Amen.” This is yet another example how Jobbik recycles old irredentist and 
nationalist poetry. It manages to revive traditions that date back to the inter-war era, after 
which they were replaced by the socialist canon, but apparently not entirely forgotten (cf. 
Kovács, 2016; Feischmidt, 2014).   
Anthems 
“Hymn” (Himnusz) is the official national anthem of Hungary and it was sung in the 
beginning of both 23 October and 15 March mass rallies. Hymn together with other two 
anthems, “Summons” (Szózat), which is considered to be the second national anthem of 
Hungary, and “Székely Hymn” (Székely himnusz) formed a symbolic frame for Jobbik 
mass rallies. Usually the Hymn marked the beginning of the event and Summons and 
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Székely Hymn the end of it. This common act, singing together, brought the focus of the 
audience to the stage and made the presence of the crowd more tangible. The ritual of 
singing together the national anthem also labels the event as national and frames it distinct 
from the everyday. Including the Székely hymn marks also solidarity towards the 
Hungarians living outside the current borders. 
 
Picture 21 After the head 
of Jobbik Budapest, 
György Szilágyi had 
finished his speech, the 
first half of the event 
ended with singing Szózat 
and Székely himnusz. 
 
Besides the traditional anthems “Hymn” and “Summons” that date back to the national 
romantic 19th century and “Székely hymn”, which was written and composed soon after 
the Treaty of Trianon, also newer nationalist songs were significant part of the events. 
These songs often draw their inspiration from old nationalist elements or simply combine 
new melodies with old poems. Particularly significant place was given to Jobbik Youth 
Division’s new song “Ancient flame” (Ősi láng) that was performed for the first time in 
the 23 October gathering (Jobbik Youth Division, 2013). This uplifting “battle song” 
clearly aims at raising the spirits of Jobbik’s young supporters and fits well to the type of 
nationalist rock songs that are popular among the members of the subculture that 
surrounds the party. Songs and music together with visual symbols open different 
channels for communicating the Jobbikian world view. In some respects, they can be even 
more effective than the speeches in delivering political messages, since they are presented 
in a more appealing form and work also partly unconsciously. 
Processions and marching 
Processions formed a central ritual element in both 23 October and 15 March Jobbik’s 
gatherings. They marked the end of the smaller “warm-up” events and made moving 
together to the main event more meaningful. The 23 October procession was built around 
the theme “victims of the government” and was therefore led by two tractors symbolising 
the Hungarian land and farmers. The 15 March procession emphasised the role of 
Jobbik’s politicians who were marching in the front line carrying a big banner. Many 
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people who participated in this procession were wearing a white campaign jacket and 
almost everyone had in their hands either a red, white or green balloon with the message 
“May Jobbik win!” (Győzzön a Jobbik!) or since the party’s name is a pun “May the better 
win!” The idea was to have all in all 1848 balloons to commemorate the year of 15 March 
revolution. In both of the processions, huge flags at the front of the crowd dominated the 
visual outlook of the events.  
 
Picture 22 The 
marching crowd was 
led by a group of 
Jobbik MP 
candidates holding a 
big banner with the 
opening words of 
Petőfi’s National 
song, “On your feet, 
Hungarian!” 
(Talpra, magyar!) 
 
During 23 October march, massive Hungarian, Árpád and Székely flags were carried 
together with a smaller Polish flag, which is used to express the solidarity between the 
two nations. On 15 March the Hungarian flag with coat of arms and the Árpád flag had 
the biggest visibility followed by numerous historical flags that are reminders of 
Hungary’s more glorious past (see Picture 22).  
Balloon release 
After the 15 March procession had reached its destination at Deák square, one of the most 
visually impressive rituals, releasing the balloons, was enacted (see Picture 23). People 
were told to let the balloons free with the words: “We will send on their way these national 
coloured air balloons, and if it depends on us, and if on 6 April we will get the trust of the 
people, the nation and the Hungariannes will rise like this, fly free, freed from the 24 and 
the earlier 44 year of colonialism. May Jobbik win! May Hungary win!” The balloons 
were freed with dramatic uplifting music rising with the balloons and clearly the aim was 
to offer the people a strong experience to which everyone could equally participate. This 
symbolic act combined nationalistically framed visual and auditory dimensions with a 
clear party-political message, in which Jobbik’s success as a party was linked to the faith 
of the nation: Jobbik’s victory is Hungary’s victory. Balloon release is an illustrative 
example of a ritual, which creates solidarity through common participation (see Kertzer, 
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1988; Durkheim, 1964). It also involves the participants without bringing to surface 
possible ideological disagreements.     
 
Picture 23  
The balloon 
release  
 
Ritual activities among the supporters 
All Jobbik events contained some ritual ceremonies that were not coordinated by the 
party. These were not part of the official programme of the gatherings and varied from a 
semi-official flag ceremony during 20 August family day (Picture 24 A. and B.) to small 
processions of people arriving in the place where the events were held (for example 
Picture 25). Also different associations were given space to perform their own rituals, for 
example, the “National hearted motorcyclists” had their own processions before the 
departure of the main crowd both in October and November (see Picture 7). In addition, 
some paramilitary groups associated with the party marched to the main scene of events 
in separate units and were often accompanied by drumming or march music. Jobbik is 
rather open to these kinds of initiatives, which can be related to the party’s past as a social 
movement or the common populist tendency to include various sub-groups under a 
common cause, which then form a rather miscellaneous company. 
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Picture 24 A.) In this photo a couple of guard members together with two almost identical looking bald 
young man performed hoisting a flag ceremony. One of the bald men is holding up the Árpád flag, 
whereas the other one is holding one corner of the Székely flag just like two Hungarian guard members, 
a man and a woman, and three other men. Two kids are following nearby. The whole flag hoisting 
process had ceremonial features, but it did not involve the people present in the event, nor was it part of 
the official programme. In the background one can see the big white tent where the discussions were 
held and many smaller tents which were either promoting some of Jobbik factions and the New 
Hungarian Guard, offering activities for kids or selling nationalistic accessories and clothes or traditional 
Hungarian food.  
B.) Here both the Árpád and the Székely flags are up. Most of the people are, however, not actively 
following the ceremonial act. On the right corner, behind the loudspeakers, one can see people eating 
and drinking while sitting on long benches. Next to them were food tents and it was promoted that the 
food and drinks offered in the event were traditional and Hungarian. (Photo essay August 20, 2013, 13:14 
and 13:18, parts 3/15 and 4/15.) 
 
In Jobbik’s gatherings flags are used both as political tools and expressions of identity. 
The sacred flag, which symbolises the group identifying with it, is often surrounded with 
ritual activities such as “Flag Folding” or “Pledge of Alliance” (see Elgenius, 2005; 
Marvin & Ingle, 1999). The ceremonial acts performed by Jobbik supporters are less 
sanctioned than official ceremonies, but clearly show similar respect towards the 
ceremonial object such as the flag. The sacred treatment of the flag is however mixed 
with more banal uses of same symbols. For example, the Árpád stripes, which can be 
simultaneously found in T-shirts and treated with respect in a flag hoisting ceremony.      
Besides the eye-catching flag ceremony introduced above (see Picture 24), there were 
also smaller spontaneous ritual acts such as small groups of men arriving to the gathering 
marching with flags. One of these instances is caught on Picture 25, which shows six men 
walking with a big Árpád flag and one man holding the Székely flag. The men are dressed 
in dark clothes with black boots and some are wearing black caps. This represents well 
the way Jobbik’s supporters are typically dressed. The map of Greater Hungary can be 
found from the two of the caps as well as from one of the hooded jacket. This dressing 
 79 
and marching resembles the dressing of the paramilitary groups associated with Jobbik 
such as the New Hungarian Guard as well as the “Hungarian National Guard” and the 
“Brighter Future Association” (Szebb jövőért egyesület)16. Admiration of organized 
(para)military activities and army style dressing is also characteristic for several Jobbik 
supporters, who do not carry any such symbols that could be directly linked to one of the 
associations mentioned above. 
 
Picture 25 A small group of 
men arriving to the gathering 
23 October 
 
The Hungarian Guard and its symbolic dimension 
The original Hungarian Guard movement, and the related association was founded by 
Jobbik’s leader Gábor Vona in June 2007 (Balogh, 2012, p. 246). The guard was profiled 
as an order bringing organization in the rural areas which were suffering according to 
Jobbik from “gypsy criminality” that was identified as one of the central problems of 
Hungary in Jobbik 2010 Election Manifesto. The functioning of the guard was banned 2 
July 2009, because according to the court decision, their activities increased ethnic 
tensions and violated others rights and freedom (Index, 2.7.2009). However, only nine 
days later, 11 July, “The New Hungarian Guard” was founded by acclamation in 
Budapest. According to the court decision made in 2010, The New Hungarian Guard is 
not a successor of the earlier Hungarian Guard and has therefore right to function. (New 
Hungarian Guard, 2016.) Nonetheless, the general appearance and uniforms of the new 
guard members resembles the old guard unmistakably. In addition, their greeting “May 
God grant it!” (Adjon az isten!), “Brighter future!” (Szebb jövőt!), oath made for the Holy 
Crown (Szent Korona), and motto “Faith. Strength. Will.” (Hit. Erő. Akarat.), coat of 
arms and flag are practically all the same as the original guard’s. This was acknowledged 
in 2014 by the authorities after the official complaint made by “Legal Defence Bureau 
                                                 
16 Brighter Future Association was dismantled in the Autumn 2014, but almost immediately re-
established under the name “Hungarians’ self-defense movement” (HVG, 18.10.2014).    
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for National and Ethnic Minorities” (A Nemzeti és Etnikai Kisebbségi Jogvédő Iroda) in 
2013 (Romasajtóközpont, 12.3.2014). 
 
Picture 26 Two guard members 
 
Picture 27 The New Hungarian Guard members’ dressing resembles 
unmistakably the old Hungarian guard uniforms 
 
The guard uniform consists of black trousers, black boots, white shirt and a black vest 
with a white/silver lion on the back (a black jacket in winter), an Árpád stripe red and 
white scarf and a black “Bocskai” style cap with a high front (see Picture 26 and Picture 
27). During the national day gatherings, the intentionally little disorganized guard and 
their “non-uniform” uniforms made visible the game that The New Hungarian Guard 
plays with legal limits. I soon noticed, that for example the black jackets were not all 
exactly the same and some wore bomber jackets or leather jackets and similarly, others 
wore instead of the “Bocskai cap” a regular black cap, just to mention a few examples. In 
addition, marching together with the rest of Jobbik supporters was done in semi-organized 
lines and the guard seemed to occasionally merge with the rest of the marchers. This all 
appeared as an intentional move, clearly defying the court order, but giving some leeway 
against possible accusations. This becomes clear in the guard captain István Mészáros’ 
defence lawyer’s speech in a court hearing in 2016, in which he claims that the New 
Hungarian guard does not march or stand in military formation and when it comes to the 
guard greeting it is just a common old Levente-movements greeting (BAON, 12.4.2016).  
The behaviour of the members of the New Hungarian Guard reveals the power hidden in 
the symbols. Banning the guard meant also banning of the offending uniform,17 and it is 
the presence of this symbol what creates the feelings of threat and fear in others, as well 
                                                 
17 After several long disputes, it was ruled in the so called “Lex Gárda” that the ban of The Hungarian 
Guard meant that also using the guard uniform is forbidden (Index, 15.12.2009). 
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as, feelings of pride and superiority in their carriers. On the other hand, symbols are more 
ambiguous than words: the kind of message sent by boots, white shirt and black vest 
depends on the context, and therefore it is easy to feign innocence. Jobbik’s and the 
original Hungarian guard’s leader Gábor Vona writes for the party magazine Bar!kád 
(22.8.2013)  that the situation has gone so far, that nowadays it appears to be a crime to 
wear a white shirt and a black vest, but my photo material reveals that this is not the case. 
On the contrary, for example 23 October, the police were observing from a close range 
the marching of the guard members dressed in guard uniform in a clearly defined unit 
without any interruption (see Picture 28). It seems, that Jobbik’s leadership is painfully 
aware of the significant symbolic role the guard played during the sudden rise of the 
party’s popularity during years 2007-2009, and is therefore reluctant to let go of this 
powerful symbolic tool, which allows them to appear as a competent order bringing force 
in the eyes of their supporters.  
Looking beyond this game that is testing the limits of legality, it seems apparent to 
everyone, that “The Hungarian Guard” and “The New Hungarian Guard” are the same, 
only with slightly different emphasises. Even Gábor Vona does nothing to hide this and 
attends regularly events organized by the New Hungarian Guard. Vona has stated that 
since the founding of Jobbik and the guard their fates are tied together and inseparable 
(Nemzeti1TV, 1.7.2014). Similarly in his column, Vona writes that the Hungarian 
Guards’ only fault is being Hungarian and a guard and that it will exist as long as Jobbik 
will (Bar!kád, 22.8.2013). 
Although, the Guard as a symbol is distinctive compared to the other visual and verbal 
symbols present in the gatherings, it too draws inspiration from the inter-war years. As a 
living symbol, the guard members embody and re-enact the idea of the revisionist 
paramilitary movements, such as the Levente movement (see Connerton, 1989). It was 
formed as a response to a current issue perceived as a problem by Jobbik, i.e. the so called 
“gypsy criminality”, but the model for the “solution” comes from the inter-war ideal of 
paramilitary organisation bringing order and discipline.  
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Picture 28 The New Hungarian Guard is marching to Deák tér led by their captain István Mészáros. In the 
beginning the guard members and other supporters were more mixed, but here the guard marched already 
as a unit that was separate from the rest of Jobbik supporters. They obviously did not even try to hide their 
presence in the event. The uniforms and general appearance of the New Guard members resembles the old 
guard uniform unmistakably, however with a closer look I noticed that the black jackets are not all exactly 
the same and some of the caps were regular black caps etc. Overall the way the guard members were dressed 
was not as strictly regulated as the use of the old guard clothes seem to have been. This all might be an 
intentional move to avoid accusations of using the old guard uniform: intentional non-uniformity of the 
uniforms. It is also visible that people are gathered on the sidewalks to watch the march. Some were clearly 
Jobbik supporters, but there were also passers-by and tourists. Here the guard is passing the building of the 
Central European University right in the heart of Budapest. (Photo essay October 23, 2013, part 13/19.)  
5.5 Talking the “Jobbikian nationhood” – creating martyrs, heroes and 
enemies  
In this subchapter I analyse the speeches held by Jobbik’s leadership during 23 October 
2013 and 15 March 2014 national day gatherings. I bring under closer scrutiny parts of 
Gábor Vona’s speeches that address the themes relevant for my thesis, such as: talking 
the nation i.e. constructing the “Jobbikian” nationhood, conscious manipulation of history 
and collective memory for present purposes, and positioning Jobbik on the current 
political field by creating a new frontier against the governing party Fidesz as well as 
choosing to abandon the radical rhetoric in order to become a real people’s party. In 
addition, I shortly examine the role of the audience during the speeches and the interaction 
between them and the party leaders. I have also included transcriptions of the reactions 
of the audience that were audible on the recordings.       
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On 23 October 2013 at the Deák square the leader of Jobbik, Gábor Vona, was the main 
speaker of the national day gathering. His main message was that the supporters of Jobbik 
are the true descendants of the 1956 revolution.  
In 1956, there were three roads. Three roads. The first road, the first choice was of those who 
hated the revolution and hated the revolutionaries. Those, who did not wait for anything else, 
just that the Soviet tanks would finally arrive and crush the insurrection. […] Then there was 
another option, another road, those who deep in their hearts might have loved the freedom, 
somewhere in the depths of their soul honoured the rebels too, but they thought it was better to 
stay out of all this. They valued more the security of civil existence, they preferred staying at 
home and waiting till the uproar ended. […] And there was a third way in '56. The path of those 
who went to the street and took up even death for freedom, for justice and for well-fare. Those 
who braved the Russian tanks, who fought for those who pulled their curtains in their homes, 
that they would not see those who became heroes there and then, who were able to rise above 
their lives.  
Vona continues his speech by saying that just like in 1956, in 2013 people have three 
options. According to him, all the left wing parties today represent the same traitors as 
those who were cooperating with Soviet Union in 1956, whereas Fidesz and its supporters 
present those who stayed at home and were too scared to take action. Vona sees Jobbik 
and its supporters as the successor of the heroes who fought on the streets in 1956. He 
justifies this interpretation by referring to the happenings in 2006, fifty years after the 
revolution, when radical right-wing activists were rioting on the streets of Budapest 
against the left-wing government and the prime minister Gyurcsány. 
And what did we do in 2006? In 2006, we were on the streets, we were there and faced them. 
We saw everything, we know everything. And then there, in that moment was born a new 
political generation. From seniors, middle-aged people and youngsters was born the political 
generation of 2006. As in 1956 October was born the political generation of ‘56, so was born in 
2006 the political generation of 2006. And this generation, the political generation of 2006 is the 
one, which stands not only against Gyurcsány and MSZP, but also against Orbán and Fidesz. 
(That's right!) 
By drawing these imaginary lines between the current political parties and assumed three 
groupings of 1956 Vona reinterprets the history in a way that offers the party and its 
supporters possibility to identify with the heroes of 1956. Vona’s 23 October speech can 
be seen as a model example of presentism (see Olick & Robbins, 1998). Actually the 
entire 30-minute speech is largely based on this comparison between the 1956 society and 
the current one. The symbolic power of this collectively commemorated moment is 
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utilized to serve the present purposes. This is done by words that recall the historical 
events, but also by strong visual symbols, such as the “Flag of 56”. During his speech 
Vona refers twice to a famous 1956 freedom fighter Gergely Pongrátz, who concretizes 
the link between the past and present and is used to further justify Vona’s interpretation. 
He also involves the audience by asking among which party they think Pongrátz would 
choose to commemorate the day.    
 What do you think, where would Gergely Pongrátz be today? Would he perhaps listen to Gordon 
Bajnai and Bokros at the Technical University? (laughter) Would he perhaps shake hands with 
Sándor Pintér18 at Heroes Square? (Boo!) Or would he be here with us? Would he be here with 
us? (Yes!) 
In the end of his speech Vona raises the flag given to him by Pongrátz ten years earlier. 
This symbolic act further concretizes the imagined links between Jobbik and the 1956 
freedom fighters and is one of the most emotionally loaded moment during the gathering. 
Uncle Gergő! You trusted in us. And here we send the word to you now, that we are holding this 
flag, that it is in our hands. And although you entrusted us with a very difficult mission, the road 
that we have to walk is very difficult, your road is very difficult, Uncle Gergő, but we will not 
tire. (clapping hands, hurray!) For Hungary! Thank you for listening. May God grant it! 
(Brighter future!, It was good!, clapping hands, You were good, Vona!) 
Analysing the speeches held during the national day gatherings offer interesting insights 
into the active process of reinterpreting history (cf. Zerubavel, 1995; Olick & Robbins, 
1998). In times when there is little consensus, the processes of editing history from the 
present perspective become more visible due to coexistence of several varying 
interpretations. During the speeches held by central Jobbik figures I could spot other 
examples of presentism in line with Vona’s comparison. For example, on 15 March, 
Jobbik politician Enikő Hegedűsné Kovács states that: “Petőfi is with us, we are the true 
descendants of Youth of March”19. Similarly, Előd Novák, then the deputy chairmen of 
Jobbik, declared in his speech that “Jobbik is the descendant of the Youth of March”. In 
addition, the EU was frequently presented parallel to the Habsburg empire or the Soviet 
Union.  
Vona’s 15 March 2014 speech focused on freedom, which is a common theme when 
talking about the 1848 Revolution, which is also known as the 1848-1849 Freedom fight. 
                                                 
18 Gordon Bajnai and Lajos Bokros are opposition figures who gave speeches in the left-wing gathering. 
Sándor Pintér is the Minister of the Interior of Hungary, who gave a speech in the Fidesz gathering. 
19 The young revolutionary activists of 1848 are often referred as “the Youth of March” (márciusi ifjak). 
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Again Vona brings the essence of the memory of a historical event to the context of the 
present day Hungary.  
But there has been much less talk about, whether we are free here, right now in 2014? (We are 
not!) There has been no talk about that in the past 24 years, while they said platitudes about 
freedom every year, in the past 24 years they pushed this country into slavery, they pushed into 
slavery our people and nation. […] Let’s say it out finally: we are not free! We would need a 
real economic freedom fight in this country. 
Later Vona returns to this theme, by saying that all the generations need to fight for the 
Hungarian freedom. He defines the need for freedom as a Hungarian national character. 
Vona takes this definition so far that he ends up claiming that those who do not understand 
this yearning are not Hungarians.   
Throughout our history, if we look through it, like a blood-soaked red line runs through the 
struggle for freedom. And so it is now. Now, we are standing here in the rain, in the cold, but we 
are here regardless. Our hearts are hot, because we want this freedom. […] Anyone who thinks 
that the Hungarians, at some point, can be deprived from their liberty, does not understand us, 
does not see into our hearts, is not a Hungarian. 
According to Vona the need for freedom is burnt into Hungarian genes. Then he 
represents the birth of the Hungarian nation in the form of a creation myth which he 
locates to the Eurasian plains. Attila the Hun, who is part of an older mythological layer 
in the Jobbikian self-image, is seen together with Árpád, as the forefather of the 
Hungarians. 
Why is it, that from time to time the power that is written in our viscera, burnt into our genes and 
burning in our souls reappear again and again. That it bursts out. That we would fight again and 
again our battle for the Hungarian freedom. […] We know it very well, that we developed into 
a nation on the Eurasian plains, steppes. We grew up there. We were born there. On the endless 
plains. We were born as the people of the plains. As grandchildren of Attila and children of 
Árpád. And when we were born, and opened our eyes, and we looked at this world, we saw 
endless plains. And we saw how beautiful is the creation of God. We saw the sun, moons and 
stars and we sniffed into the air and understood, we felt that there was nothing more wonderful, 
more beautiful than freedom. 
The above sequences with strong emphasis of common ancestry confirm that the 
Jobbikian nationalism is clearly founded on the belief of ethnic basis of national identity. 
Since the ethnic nationalism is based on the idea of “being the same blood” it is 
consequently more exclusive than the civic national identity that relies on the idea of legal 
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and political rights and citizenship (see e.g. Smith 1991). Ethnic national identity also 
tends to emphasise national symbolism such as national flags and anthems. Furthermore, 
it can be viewed as a case of national essentialism, which has been linked to negative 
attitudes towards out-group members. (see e.g. Golec de Zavala & Schatz, 2013.) This 
emphasis on the shared ethnic origins is apparent not only in Gábor Vona’s speeches, but 
appears also in Jobbik’s 2014 Election Programme. For example, the section that deals 
with the “national politics”, referring to a Hungarian nation that reaches over the current 
borders, starts with a heading “we are from the same blood” (Jobbik 2014b, p. 77).   
It is contradictory that Jobbik intends to speak in the name of the whole nation (including 
the Hungarians living both in the current state and in the neighbouring countries), but 
simultaneously excludes many minority groups and some political opponents and their 
supporters from it. This contradiction is actually inherent to the concept of nation that 
assumes oneness (see e.g. Elgenius, 2011), but is fought over by several political parties 
claiming to talk in the name of the whole nation. In Hungary the intertwined nature of 
political and national identities becomes most apparent during the national days, when 
political parties celebrate and commemorate the past dividedly in their own gatherings. 
One could even say that during Jobbik’s national day celebrations it is not national 
identity, but Jobbik’s party identity masked in national colours that is being promoted. 
On the other hand, the national dimension is so central to Jobbik that it is hard to imagine 
what being a Jobbik supporter would mean without the national component.    
The forthcoming elections greatly influenced Vona’s speeches. One of his main aims was 
to build a new frontier against the ruling party Fidesz. In the 2010 election Jobbik still 
positioned itself mainly against the then ruling MSZP (the socialist party). However, 
during the time of my observations in 2013 and 2014 Jobbik had to re-position itself in 
relation to the now governing party, conservative Fidesz, towards which Jobbik 
supporters traditionally felt more approving (cf. Mouffe, 2005; Palonen, 2006).  
And meanwhile, we see that both of the two parties, and both of the two blocks, in fact, want to 
give Hungary the same box, but tied with different coloured ribbons. One ties the box with red, 
the other one with orange ribbon. But what's in this box? (Jews!) Lie, fraud, theft and treason.  
Vona’s speeches show how he aims at redefining the character of the governing party 
Fidesz as the same corrupt elite as MSZP and this way aiming of transferring the negative 
sentiments commonly felt against the Socialist to include also Fidesz. Simultaneously 
Jobbik is presented as the untainted option represented by politician with clear 
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conscience. Furthermore, Vona likes to present himself as a victim of unfounded 
accusations of anti-Semitism and Nazism. But has simultaneously allowed his party 
members to present openly anti-Semitic, racist and homophobic statements during the 
party gatherings such as the comments of Jobbik MP Sándor Pörzse during the “National 
Press club” (Nemzeti sajtóklub) organized on August 20, 2013 Jobbik family day. Vona 
is even ready to wear the cloak of martyr as he declares that he is prepared to die for his 
country. Everyone else seems to judge Jobbik, which alone is fighting for the justice.      
Today, on our national celebration a few hundred meters away from here, activists handed out 
fliers, which said: vote anyone, but Jobbik! (Boo!) [...] Or when the chief advisor of Viktor Orbán 
says that the Socialist Party is only a rival for them, but the adversary is Jobbik, and against them 
we should even unite. [...] And when I get on a daily basis death threats. [...] Because if anyone 
thinks that I can be intimidated, he is wrong. My grandfather, Gábor Vona, gave his life for the 
homeland in Transylvania. If the good Lord chose the fate that I should die for this country, die 
for this nation, I will proudly undertake it. (Applause, Hurray!) 
During Vona’s speeches one of the main themes of the previous election campaign, the 
“gypsy problem” and “gypsy criminality” (see e.g. Jobbik, 2010b), was strikingly absent. 
However, it did come up occasionally during other Jobbik politicians’ speeches. For 
example, Jobbik MP, Dániel Z. Kárpát was referring mockingly to a “26-year old 
grandfather from Borsod who gets more discounts than an average victim of the foreign 
currency loans” in his speech on 15 March. In the Hungarian context this refers obviously 
to the Roma who are thought to have children just to get more state support. Similarly, 
another Jobbik MP, Dóra Dúró spoke on 20 August about a Roma who had missed a 
doctor’s appointment because she did not know what 14:00 means, since the biggest 
number in the clock is 12.  
These condescending attitudes towards the Roma seem to go hand in hand with anti-
Semitic and homophobic statements that were most blatant during the 20 August 
“National Press club”. There the discussants, Gábor Pál (Alfahír and Hazai pálya main 
editor), József Hering (Kuruc info’s newspaper writer), Sándor Pörzse (Bar!kád main 
editor) and Richárd Lánczi (N1 TV main editor) did nothing to conceal their attitudes 
when bringing up in a paranoid manner themes such Jewish world conspiracy that reaches 
Hungary, or expressing how sick openly homosexual behaviour made them feel. These 
kinds of statements are carefully avoided by Jobbik leader Gábor Vona, who only once 
refers ambiguously to “international background powers” (nemzetközi háttérhatalmak) 
and demands an account of parliament members holding double citizenship. This topic 
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has been brought up by Jobbik in parliament especially in connection to possible citizens 
of Israel (Alfahír, 19.2.2013). 
Despite the fact that Gábor Vona avoids publicly statements that could be labelled as 
racist, he does nothing to stop the frequent “Filthy Jews!” (Mocskos zsidók!) shouts from 
the audience during his speeches. These two words are regularly used to comment 
practically anyone who is seen as an adversary to the party and it is one of the most 
common verbal reaction of the audience besides the “Home traitors” (Hazaárulók!) 
shouts, which are used almost synonymously to comment on anything that is perceived 
negatively. In the past years Vona has worked hard to polish his image after the earlier 
accusation of racism and anti-Semitism and wants to now appear as a leader of a “people’s 
party” (néppárt) (Nemzeti1TV, 21.6.2014). It should, however, not be forgotten that both 
the Roma and the Jews have played a significant role as “the other” in building the 
Jobbikian nationhood.  
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6 Conclusions 
In this thesis I have introduced the diverse, multisensory universe of symbols, rituals and 
speech acts through which the Jobbikian nationhood and identity is constructed, 
articulated and performed by both the party leadership and the participants during the 
Hungarian national day gatherings. The symbols present in the events often draw their 
power and meanings from the inter-war revisionism and nostalgic dream of the Greater 
Hungary. They form a distinct dimension open for varied expressions of nationhood. This 
is contrasted by the speeches of the party leadership, which offer more limited 
possibilities for participation.  
The symbols, such as the Árpád flag and the Map of Greater Hungary, are by nature 
dividing, since not all Hungarians can identify with them. This division is partly lessened 
by the use of generally accepted national symbols such as the Flag of Hungary and singing 
together the national anthem “Himnusz”.  However, it is the dividing symbols that make 
Jobbik’s gatherings stand out from the more “mainstream” usage of nationalist symbols. 
They also seem to function as means for creating solidarity among Jobbik supporters. The 
symbols are used to send messages to other participants and can be seen as a conscious 
decision of the carrier to identify with the Jobbikian version of “true Hungarianness”. To 
conclude my analysis, I first return to my theoretical starting points and place my 
empirical findings to the wider theoretical frame. 
6.1 The elementary forms of nationalism 
In his study of the most elementary forms of the religious life, Durkheim (1964 [1912]) 
researched totemism among the Australian Aboriginals. His famous revelation was that 
by worshipping a totem the community actually worships itself. Totem is therefore a 
symbol of the community. Researchers representing the neo-Durkheimian school have 
tried to explain the character of nationalism with the help of Durkheimian understanding 
of rituals as performances that create solidarity. They have for example drawn analogies 
between national flags and totems (see Marvin & Ingle, 1999). The core idea of a symbol 
representing the community or a nation remains analytically enlightening. Breuilly (1994) 
has claimed that nationalism differs from other ideologies such as religion or socialism, 
since it has a self-referential quality. According to him, nationalists worship themselves 
instead of a transcendent God or a future utopia (ibid., p. 64). Can it be then said that 
nationalism has preserved better than most religions something essential that was visible 
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in the rituals of the Aboriginal communities? Is the strong self-referential character of 
nationalism the reason behind its continuous success?  
Jobbik has been successful in mobilising and monopolising various old symbols (e.g. 
flags and coat of arms) to justify its own version of nationalism. It has managed to present 
the party’s ideology as Hungarianness and something more: a better and prouder version 
of Hungarianness, a national identity free of often negative self-reference that is common 
for Hungarians whose history is characterized by failed revolutions and lost wars (cf. 
Feischmidt, 2014). On the other hand, the current situation is seen as something shameful 
and the pride is called upon with the help of nostalgia.  
Jobbik has been particularly skilful in creating and nourishing a subculture to support its 
political goals (see Jeskó et al., 2012). This industry, which varies from nationalist rock 
music to shops selling all imaginable items for expressing one’s true Hungarian identity, 
as well as individuality, appears as a successful fusion of political and nationalistic 
ideology with modern, market economy boosted, mass individualism. The expressions of 
this “Jobbikian nationhood” can be observed first hand in all their diversity during the 
national day gatherings, where the true believers meet each other and “show their 
colours”. The events are filled with nationalistic symbols which offer the supporters the 
possibility to express simultaneously their individuality, such as membership in a 
motorbike club, combined with the Jobbikian nationalism. The air is thick of visual 
communication through various symbols that create a sense of belonging and solidarity. 
Although all Jobbik supporters are unlikely to be deeply aware of the origins of the 
symbols and the meanings attached to them, they still carry a certain “historical weight”, 
which is essential part of the nature of the events.   
For Jobbik’s party leadership these symbols, such as the Árpád flag, are powerful political 
tools that can be used to harness the heroic past condensed in them. The use of symbols 
that contain powerful nationalistic, nostalgic and religious elements, mobilises such 
emotional potential, which the left-wing parties, in their pragmatic attempts to rely on 
facts and figures, can only dream of. The importance of these symbols and rituals 
becomes apparent when one tries to imagine these events (and the social life in general) 
without the symbols. Symbolic elements that condense meanings are essentially part of 
the human condition. The gatherings create Durkheimian solidarity among the 
participants and emphasise oneness, but this unity does not mean inclusion and consensus, 
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but drawing the lines between “us” and “them” and exclusion (cf. Elgenius, 2011; 
Mouffe, 2005). Symbols are used in the gatherings to draw these boundaries. 
In addition to symbolic and ritualistic references to the past, Jobbik’s leadership is 
actively and consciously utilizing Hungarians’ collective memory (see Halbwachs, 1980, 
1992). The symbolic contents, such as the legacies of the three national days, are 
harnessed to serve the present political goals. The speeches focus mainly on themes 
related to the national days and the approaching elections, whereas the symbols’ draw 
their power from Trianon and the dream of the Greater Hungary, but they can both be 
seen as examples of instrumental presentism. This “memory entrepreneurship” is most 
apparent in Vona’s speeches, but monopolizing symbols is an example of a very similar 
use of power over the historical meanings.    
Modern performances during national day gatherings often aim at reaching the audience 
emotionally through different ritual elements such as music, singing and marching as well 
as rhetorically persuasive speeches. These “moral dramas” seek to provide to the audience 
an illusion of authenticity (see Giesen, 2006). However, they rarely succeed in creating a 
state that could be called as Durkheimian “collective effervescence” among modern 
audiences (cf. Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Skey, 2006). But does this mean that these 
rituals do not work? In Jobbik’s gatherings it becomes apparent, that the dichotomy 
between “banal” and “hot” nationalism is in reality a continuum. Modern rituals are best 
seen somewhere between the mundane, everyday nationalism and moments of truly 
heated nationalism (see Billig, 1995; Skey, 2006; Collins, 2014). They do, nevertheless, 
maintain the ability to mobilize people through past events, if the present situation 
demands it. This was seen in Hungary during 23 October commemorations in 2006. The 
mobilization of people would not have been possible, if the meanings related to this 
specific day had not been available for the audience. This potential is something that can 
be maintained through repetition. Appealing to people’s feelings during national day 
gatherings appears especially important for populist parties such as Jobbik. This does not 
necessarily mean that their, sometimes rather foreseeable programmes, would be capable 
of stirring the audience’s pulse. They seem to instead rely more on repetition and 
traditional elements that can strengthen the sense of solidarity, security and continuity, 
which are central functions of rituals.  
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6.2 What is shown and what is said – flirting with revisionism 
In Hungary national days are moments of political contestations and therefore 
contestations of different understandings of Hungarian nationhood. The fact that national 
days are commemorated and celebrated in politically fragmented units, makes unusually 
visible the processes through which past meanings are fought in the political arena. The 
St. Stephen day fireworks on 20 August are an exception being one of the only national 
day rituals that is usually able to bring together people across political divisions. 
During the time I observed Jobbik’s gatherings the party leadership took an intentional 
shift towards less radical rhetoric. This raised dissatisfaction among some of the “hard 
core” (keménymag) supporters, as Vona himself put it (Nemzeti1TV, 21.6.2014). 
Therefore, the current situation is fruitful for observing the advancement of the possible 
divide between Jobbik’s core supporters and the party leadership. This phenomenon led 
also to a rise of a new, even more radical group, “Hungarian Dawn” (Magyar Hajnal), 
which ridiculed Jobbik’s 2014 election campaign and its new softer face on its now closed 
home page.  
Jobbik, which has become world known by its paramilitary guard, is now trying to present 
itself as a people’s party (néppárt) and is constantly playing with blurred interpretations 
and meanings. It is simultaneously trying to attract the interest of a larger public and meet 
the needs of its core supporters. This is necessary since Jobbik wishes to win the 
forthcoming parliamentary election in 2018 and as Vona puts it “who moves the 
subculture, stays in the subculture” (Vona’s speech in 2014 party conference). The actions 
and rhetoric of Jobbik’s politicians has since the beginning of the party’s existence been 
a complex game of what is accepted and what is not. It has been argued that the rise of 
Jobbik has led to a significant change in what is considered to be the polite and the 
permissible in Hungary (see Stewart, 2012). Vona himself admits that the shift towards a 
more moderate rhetoric does not mean less radical ideology (Vona’s speech in 2014 party 
conference). Is this together with allowing the crowd to shout “filthy Jews” (mocskos 
zsidók) during the national day gatherings going to be enough to satisfy its long term 
supporters?   
The visual symbolic expressions in Jobbik’s gatherings appear more radical than the 
speeches of the party leaders. Based on my observations it seems that the visual sphere in 
general is more open to ambiguous radical expressions: what cannot be said can still be 
shown. Using clearly revisionist symbols in the present context as well as supporting 
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various paramilitary activities can be seen as flirting with revisionism and racism. These 
connections can then be verbally denied if someone from the outside questions them. This 
playing with two cards (firstly towards media and secondly towards the supporters), 
allows Jobbik to keep their activities open for various sub-groups and their own agendas.  
In addition, it is important to keep in mind Feischmidt’s (2014) point of view about the 
use of revisionist symbolism in the present day Hungary. According to her, Trianon is 
today a strong emotional symbol, which is used primarily to express the current societal 
problems, not the historical trauma. Since hardly anyone from the current generations has 
first-hand experience about Trianon and the life in the Hungarian Kingdom before the 
year 1920 it is logical to search the reasons for the use of revisionist symbolism from the 
current matters. On the other hand, the Trianon and the map of Greater Hungary are 
symbols that link the past trauma to the current questions related to the ethnic Hungarian 
minorities. These themes are present in Jobbik’s gatherings both in speeches and in 
Székely and Transylvanian symbolism. Therefore, it cannot be said that Trianon and the 
map of Greater Hungary would be as symbols completely emptied from their original 
meanings.  For example, the man standing with a self-made flag in  Picture 18, sends an 
undisputed message to the other participants: “It is the holy right and duty of every 
Hungarian to take back the stolen ancient Carpathian home”.  
6.3 Final remarks 
The results of my research provide in-depth information about the expressions of radical 
nationalism in Hungary. Nationalism is a central source of power for Jobbik, and therefore 
it is important to understand how the party uses historical events and mythologies in 
search of greater justification for its current politics. One of my initial aims was to shed 
light on what kind of role the out-groups, such as the Roma, the Jews and homosexuals, 
play in Jobbik’s rhetoric. Presenting these groups as a threat to security, Hungarian 
sovereignty or conservative Christian values, Jobbik creates images of concrete enemies 
of the nation against whom the party can justify its radical nationalist policies.    
The research could be extended by including a more extensive analysis of Jobbik’s 
webpage and the party’s Facebook page in order to achieve better understanding of the 
themes, which the supporters who are active in social media, find important and how they 
relate to issues raised by the party leadership. This could be the topic of the subsequent 
research. 
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Looking from the vantage point of 2016, it is possible to now see clearly certain 
developments, which began already in 2013, namely Gábor Vona’s attempt to move his 
party closer to the centre. Of course, some unpredictable things have happened since my 
field trips in 2013 and 2014. For example, Hungary’s new role as a gateway for people 
seeking asylum in Central and Northern Europe in 2015 has offered an opportunity for 
creating new enemy pictures. It is interesting to see how Vona attempts to build a new 
softer face of Jobbik by denying all accusations of anti-Semitism and xenophobic 
attitudes, but simultaneously argues for extremely strict immigration policy, such as 
closed camps for asylum seekers (Alfahír, 14.1.2015). This along with Vona’s recent 
statements concerning Fidesz’ national referendum on refugee quotas, such as “Neither 
poor migrant, nor rich migrant may be settled in Hungary. Neither poor terrorist, nor rich 
terrorist should be allowed to arrive to Hungary” (Index, 19.10.2016), illustrates well the 
special dynamics between the two nationalist parties, Jobbik and Fidesz, which is again 
changing what is perceived as normal and acceptable in Hungary.    
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